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Abstract
Contractual analysis has long been focused on finding the optimal pricing arrangement. How-
ever some important aspects of the contractual terms are either assumed away or neglected.
This study look at one ubiquitous term - which is the timing of payment. From the view of
anthropology or marketing literature, timing of payment is mainly determined by social cus-
toms. Although there is an indubitable element of truth in it, all normal social behavior is to
some extent customary. A positive economist cannot rest easy with such irrefutable argument.
Custom itself is often an implicit compromise of fundamental economic conflict, it deserves an
economic explanation.
My dissertation has 3 chapters. The first two chapters study directly the issue of timing of
payment under different considerations. Chapter 1 study the situation where consumers have
uncertain future alternatives, while chapter 2 study the choice of contracts under different legal
environments. The focus of chapter 3 is a bit different. It is also asking a question about timing,
but instead of the payment time, it is the bidding time. Under the situation where bidding is a
costly activity, the timing of bidding bears some resemblance to the timing of payment. The
bidding cost can be viewed as the prepayment studied in Chapter 1. This last chapter thus can
be viewed as a generalized timing of payment problem, where part of the “payment” does not
goes to the seller.
Chapter 1 studies the situation when consumers with unit demand, having uncertain future
alternatives, plan to consume at a fixed date in the future. Under this setting, uncertainty of the
future event is a source of price discrimination. One main result is, in the expected profit maxi-
mizing mechanism, the monopolist seller gets the same expected profit as if she can observe the
new information received by the consumers — the realized uncertain alternatives. This can be
implemented by the contract (T, p) where T is paid in advance and p is paid on the date. One
interesting finding is that the optimal p does not depend on the realized alternative, if the value
of the service and alternative are independent. The expected profit is higher when consumers
have more volatile alternatives.
Chapter 2 analyzes the timing of payment under different legal environments. In case of
dispute, court will get involved to resolve the conflict. I showed the efficiency of the legal
system and the fixed cost of litigation are the keys for the choice of payment timing. My model
predicts, generally speaking, ex-ante payment contract is more prevalent in region with low
fixed cost of using the legal system. But since under this situation, ex-ante payment contract is
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inefficient. I found that full efficiency can be attained by using certain mixed payment contract.
When the fixed cost is within certain bounds, ex-ante and ex-post payment contract are identical
and perfectly efficient. The model also has some implications for the proposer of the contract.
When the seller proposes, a simple ex-ante payment contract dominates ex-post payment and
mixed payment contract, which may explain why most of offers in everyday life are made by
sellers in a simple ex-ante payment form. And it suggests that primarily mixed payment is a
contractual device used by the buyer to mitigate the two sided moral hazard problem.
Chapter 3 considers the effect of bidding cost on bidding behavior. At each period, bidders
are allowed to submit or revise their bid with the associated bidding cost. This communicates
bidders’ information rapidly. A bidder makes a bid in early periods to signal a high valuation. In
equilibrium under most cases, the auction effectively ends before the mandated one. The model
provides new results concerning profit maximizing reserve price and efficiency reserve price in
a costly bidding environment. Also a information based interpretation of delays in bidding is
provided.
2
1 Timing of Payment with Uncertain
Alternatives
1.1 Introduction
In a recent New York Times Magazine, an article shows that more and more restaurants start
to charge customers for the table per se.1In contrast to the tradition where reserving a table
is free, now restaurants, particularly for those located in cities with high rent, like New York
and San Francisco, charge their customers for reservations. This allow restaurants to better
mitigate the risk that they will lose money on a diner who promises to show up and cancels.
Throughout the industry, no-shows make up 5 to 10 percent of all reservations. According to
Nick Kokonas, a former derivatives trader who is an owner of the exclusive Chicago restaurants
Next and Alinea, by selling tickets for the table, the no-show rate drops to less than 2 percent.
Fundamentally, the problem faced by both diners and restaurants, is the uncertain alternative
that diners have at the time of reservation. Similar situations happen when we pay for concerts,
airline tickets and, more recently, car-hailing service Uber.
To study this problem, I consider a simple trading environment between a monopolist seller
and consumers. The seller provides a service at a fixed date. She can sell the “tickets” at the date
of the service provided, or in advance. Each of the consumers, as different from the standard
principal agent model (Baron and Myerson, 1982), has an uncertain alternative at the service-
providing date. Instead of treating this as a outside option only, I represent it by a random
variable in the utility function, which is only effective when the consumer chooses to take
the alternative. By this formulation, consumers take alternatives into account when they form
expectations. This is a novel way to model uncertain alternative which gives a representation of
the utility with optimized choice.2
The unexpected event can be good or bad, a more attractive opportunity or something that
stops you to proceed with your plan. For example, a call for party or being sick. In response,
people may stick to the plan or change it. It is important to note that the possibility of “quitting”
at the service-providing date distinguishes this paper from the dynamic mechanism design liter-
ature. Most of the papers usually assume no opt out after the initial participation, hence consider
1Available at: http://nyti.ms/1CPlzE9
2The closest model in this aspect is Rochet and Stole (2002), which studies the case where the outside option is
random. For more details, see the literature review in section 1.6.
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only the ex-ante participation constraint but not the subsequent participation constraints.3 Most
of the results in this paper depend on the linkage between the alternative and the service. If the
value of the service and the alternative are independent to the consumer, for instance when the
alternative of going to a restaurant is a party, then the price being paid in the restaurant will be
higher than the case when they are positively correlated, like when the alternative is a similar
restaurant. The key lies on how the consumer value these two activities, if they are positively
correlated, then the alternative activity is actually a good competitor to the seller. By the well
known logic, competition lowers the price. The only difference is that the competition comes
not only from another firm but also from another individual. Given the well developed and
powerful information technology nowadays, alternatives come from everywhere.
To start with the analysis, I consider the case where the seller cannot price discriminate.
This is particularly relevant to the regulated industries. In section 1.3 I derive the optimal
uniform prices when the seller sells in advance, at the service providing date, or both. The best
strategy is to sell both in advance and at the service-providing date. Under our setting, selling
at both dates is weakly better than either one of them and yet none of the date involves zero
transaction. The choice of the timing of payment creates imperfect information. Consumers
can get full information for their alternative if the seller decides to sell at the service-providing
date. However, if the seller decides to sell in advance, only consumers with high enough value
will purchase the “ticket”. There will be a cutoff value, such that all consumers with value lower
than this cutoff, will just give up buying the service. Whereas if the “ticket” sells at the service-
providing date, consumers with high realized alternative will not buy the service. The trade off
hinges on the distribution of alternative and the distribution of the consumers’ value. Actually
under our setting, if there is one known alternative or no alternative, the optimal solution is to
practice uniform pricing. However, once the alternative becomes uncertain, the optimal selling
plan is to price discriminate. Hence the uncertainty of the future event is a source of price
discrimination. From section 1.4 onwards, the seller is allowed to price discriminate.
There is a pricing strategy which is not considered above — mixed pricing, where the total
payment involves advance payment and payment on the consumption date. After opening up
the possibility of mixed payment, in proposition 1.2, I show that the optimal price at the service
providing date, does not depend on the distribution of the alternative, if the alternative is inde-
pendent from the value for the service. The intuition for this result is that since at the service
providing date, the decision is binary — either consume or not consume, the actual realization
of the alternative does not matter. Given the type reported, there can only be two prices at the
service providing date, the price for consuming, and the price for dropping out. This makes
3See for example: Eso˝ & Szentes (2013) and Pavan, Segal & Toikka (2014). The usual argument for ignoring
the subsequent participation constraints is as follows: in quasilinear environment with unlimited transfers, the
principal can ask the agent to post a sufficiently large bond upon acceptance, to be repaid later, so as to make
it unprofitable to quit and forfeit the bond at any time during the mechanism. What I do in this paper, is to
explicitly deal with this problem, and a closed-form solution for the “bond” is obtained when the alternative
and the value is independent. Yet, the “bond” I obtain is not for keeping the agents to participate, but instead
to maximize the expected profit subject to initial participation.
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no sense if there are more than one price for consuming, people will just report the alternative
value such that the lowest price is given. Thus the actual realization of the alternative cannot
help boosting profit, and hence means virtually nothing to the seller. This is the reason why
the ex-post price does not depend on the distribution of the alternative and the rationale for the
main result of this paper.
The main result of this paper is stated as theorem 1 — In the expected profit maximizing
mechanism, the monopolist seller get the same expected profit as if she can observe the real-
ization of the uncertain alternatives. This implies that knowing the realization of the uncertain
alternative will not raise the profit of the seller. The reason is, in order to provide the incentive
to ask consumers to report their type truthfully, the ability of extracting surplus from consumers
is limited. Under the case of observable alternatives, the optimal price being charged equals to,
given the same w, the price for the lowest type who will buy. Because the price is shown to be
decreasing in type. The monopolist seller is extracting the most of what they can get. Whereas
in the general case of unobservable alternative, I propose a two part pricing mechanism. The
price paid at the service-providing date is less than the one when alternative is observable, but
the before part make this up. Hence, the optimal mechanism gets the same profit as when the
seller can freely observe the realization of the uncertain alternative. The key assumption is the
independence between the value for the service and the uncertain alternative. From the truthful
report of the consumers about their types, the seller learns nothing for the uncertain alternative.
In section 1.5, I relax the independent assumption. With the assumption of positive correla-
tion between the value and the alternative, the seller expects consumers with higher value, on
average gets higher realization of the uncertain alternative, hence charging a lower price.
Another interesting result is that the expected profit is higher when consumers face a more
volatile alternative. A mean preserving spread of the distribution function is interpreted as
increasing volatility of the random variable. The intuition of this result can be understood as
if the seller is providing an insurance. If the consumer gets unlucky, a low realization of the
alternative happens, she can consume the service. On the other hand, lucky consumer will enjoy
the high value alternative. A mean-preserving spread smooths out and increase the density of
the two end. But the lower end is covered by the seller, hence it is only the high end has effect
on the consumer well being. As the expected utility of the consumer is higher, there is more
surplus to extract. Thus the expected profit is higher.
In section 1.4.5, I analyze a behavioral deviation of the consumers. Consumers may overlook,
partly or completely, the possibility of having a future alternative. It is common to see people
get shocked by the “unexpected” events. One explanation is that people does not give enough
consideration to the possible future alternative he may have. I represent this problem by intro-
ducing an extra term ψ , which is the probability that one overlooks the possibility of having
future alternatives. Surprisingly, I show that consumers will benefit from this irrationality.
In the next section, I will introduce the model formally. In section 1.3, I study the optimal
pricing, where the seller is confined to uniform pricing of pure ex-ante or ex-post pricing. In
5
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section 1.4, the possibility of price discrimination and mixed payment is opened up. Most of
the results are obtained. Section 1.5 deals with the correlated case of the value for the service
and the alternative. In section 1.6, I compare my model with the related literature. Section
1.7 concludes and applies the results to the motivating example. Possible extensions is also
discussed.
1.2 Model Setup
Consider a risk neutral monopolist who is providing a service at date 1 with constant marginal
cost c, for example a concert or opera. She can sell “tickets” at different points of time, date 0
or date 1.4 There is a continuum of consumers with mass 1 having valuation θ for the service,
where θ ∼ F [θ , θ¯ ]. Consumers are risk neutral and have unit demand. Thus consumer’s type is
denoted by θ . Assume θ ≥ c, so that trading is efficient for all consumers. Each consumer has a
list of uncertain alternatives, I denote the highest valued alternative as w∼ G[0, w¯]. The term w
denotes the value of the alternative, net of any associated cost.5 Assume w¯≥ θ¯ , so it is possible
that all consumers take the alternative. Consumers learn the realization of w at date 1, while θ
is known at date 0. Both θ and w are private information, and are assumed to be independent.
This means that all consumers have same expected value for the alternative, regardless of his
type. The independence assumption will be relaxed in section 1.5.
The utility function of a consumer of type θ is
u=
⎧⎨⎩θ − p if he consumes the service,w if he consumes the alternative.
The price p can either be the ex-ante price pa, the ex-post price pp or the sum of both as in
section 1.4. If the consumer chooses to buy in advance at date 0, the price will be pa. However
there will not be any refund even if the consumer decides go for the alternative at date 1.6 Thus
the expected utility of a type θ consumer who pays at date 0 is
U (θ) = θG(θ)+
ˆ w¯
θ
wdG(w)− pa
= w¯−
ˆ w¯
θ
G(w)dw− pa.
In the first line, the first term is the expected benefit of the purchase, which happens with
4There may be some confusion from the wording “tickets” here, which may imply there is a capacity constraint.
However by assumption, the seller can provide unlimited amount of service at a marginal cost of c.
5A higher w may also reflect the situation, where no alternative is available but you get sick or the weather is bad
on the date of the show, and hence the net value of staying home (the default option) is higher.
6Our formulation is actually more general than this, but for the sake of exposition, the refunding interpretation is
deferred to section 1.4.
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probability G(θ). Because whatever has been paid is sunk at date 1, and the consumer will not
go to enjoy the service, in the case of better alternative arises, when w≥ θ . The second term is
the expected benefit from the alternative. The last term is the price the consumer pays for the
“ticket”. The second line is obtained from the first by integration by parts.
Consumers who buy at date 1 pay pp. The corresponding expected utility of a type θ con-
sumer is
U (θ) = (θ − pp)G(θ − pp)+
ˆ w¯
θ−pp
wdG(w)
= w¯−
ˆ w¯
θ−pp
G(w)dw.
In the first line, the first term is again the expected benefit of the purchase, which happens with
probability G(θ − pp). As the consumer will only consume the service if there is no better
alternative, i.e. when w≤ θ − pp. The second term is the expected benefit from the alternative.
The second line is again derived from the first by integration by parts.
1.3 When to sell? Now or later?
To answer the question of the optimal time to sell, I study different cases of market opening.
In subsection 1.3.1, only date 0 market is opened. In subsection 1.3.2, only date 1 market
is opened. In subsection 1.3.3, both markets are open. Noted that, in all above cases, the
monopolist charges an uniform price to all of his customers. This is relevant to any regulated
industry where price discrimination is prohibited. However prices can be different at different
points of time. The timing is as follows. At date 0 the monopolist announces and commits to
a pair of prices (pa, pp), where pa ∈ R+ stands for the ex-ante price, and pp ∈ R+ stands for
ex-post price. Consumers choose whether to buy at date 0 or not. At date 1, after uncertainties
are resolved, those who have already paid choose whether to consume the service. Those have
not paid decide whether to buy at date 1. There are three possible cases, i) only the ex-ante
market is open and that can be represented as (pa,∞); ii) only the ex-post market is open and
that can be represented as (pa,∞); iii) both ex-ante and ex-post market are open and that can
be represented as (pa, pp). These representations provide an uniform way to model different
market openings.
The main result of this section is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.1. The optimal uniform pricing scheme is the pair of (pa, pp) defined by lemma
1.3. It induces positive demand in both ex-ante and ex-post market, if F ′(θ¯) = 0.
It should be noted that, mixed payment is not studied in this section. Mixed payment means
that the total payment involves both advance payment and deferred payment, which will be
analyzed in section 1.4.
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1.3.1 Ex-ante payment
Let us first consider the case when only the ex-ante market is open. If the consumer chooses
not to consume, then her expected utility is the expected value of the alternative. The marginal
consumer who is indifferent between purchasing or not purchasing, is denoted by θa. Therefore
U(θa) = θaG(θa)+
ˆ w¯
θa
wdG(w)− pa =
ˆ w¯
0
wdG(w) .
This implies that
pa =
ˆ θa
0
G(w)dw. (1.3.1)
All consumers with θ > θa will buy the service in the ex-ante market. The remaining commits
to the alternative. By differentiation,
dθa
dpa
=
1
G(θa)
> 0.
Since θa increases with pa, a higher pa implies that less consumer will buy the service. The
profit of a monopolist which opens only the ex-ante market is
π = pa (1−F (θa))− c
ˆ θ¯
θa
G(θ)dF (θ) (1.3.2)
Although consumers pay for the service, they will not necessarily consume it. This is the reason
why the term attached to the cost part is different to one attached to the price. Consumers with
w≥ θ , will opt for the alternative. The probability of consuming for a type θ consumer is G(θ).
Because pa is sunk at date 1, there will be over-consumption. The consumers who have already
paid act as if the service is free and give up the other valuable alternative which will be taken if
they are ask to pa at date 1.
Lemma 1.1. The profit maximizing p∗a and θ ∗a satisfies
p∗a =
ˆ θ∗a
0
G(w)dw= G(θ ∗a )
(
c+
1−F (θ ∗a )
F ′ (θ ∗a )
)
. (1.3.3)
If
´ θ∗a
0 G(w)dw
G(θ∗a )
is increasing in θa, together with the standard assumption of decreasing hazard
rate, there is an unique θa. The first assumption is satisfied by the uniform distribution. 7
7Take G(·) = w/ w¯,
´ θ∗a
0 G(w)dw
G(θ∗a )
= θ
2
a /2w¯
θa/w¯ =
θa
2 .
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1.3.2 Ex-post payment
Let us then consider the case where only the ex-post market is open. Consumer will only
consume if the realized value of w ≤ θ − pp, where consumer with θ < pp will never buy the
service. The profit is
π = (pp− c)
ˆ θ¯
pp
G(θ − pp)dF (θ) . (1.3.4)
Lemma 1.2. The profit maximizing p∗p satisfies
p∗p = c+
´ θ¯
p∗p
G
(
θ − p∗p
)
dF (θ)
´ θ¯
p∗p
G′
(
θ − p∗p
)
dF (θ)
. (1.3.5)
Because p∗p ≥ c, there is under-consumption. Because the price pp is charged at a level higher
than cost c, consumption will not be efficient. The optimal solution will be interior because the
corner solutions are clearly not maximizing profit. While there does not exist “the” highest
price, we just need to consider the pp = θ¯ . Because for any pp > θ¯ , there is definitely no one
will buy the service. When pp = θ¯ , π = 0. Thus the optimal solution should be an interior one,
as the π∗ is positive.8
1.3.3 Ex-ante and ex-post payments
Let us now consider the case where both markets are open. There are three choices for
consumers, i) buy at date 0 and pay pa, ii) buy at date 1 and pay pp, iii) not buy at all. The
marginal consumer, who is indifferent between to buy at date 0 and date 1, is denoted by θ˜ . It
can be shown that9
pa =
ˆ θ˜
θ˜−pp
G(w)dw. (1.3.6)
It is clear that θ˜ ≥ pp, otherwise there is no way to satisfy the equation. This implies that
consumers who buy at date 0 must have higher value than those who buy at date 1. Recall
equation (1.3.1), pa =
´ θa
0 G(w)dw gives the type (θa) which is indifferent between buying at
date 0 and not buying at all. By comparing equation (1.3.1) and equation (1.3.6), we know that
θa ≤ θ˜ . Hence θ˜ is a sufficient statistics to determine whether the consumer will buy at date 0.
8The sufficient condition for the interior solution is(pp− c)
(
G′ (0)(1−F(pp))+
´ θ¯
pp
G′′ (θ − pp)dF (θ)
)
≤
2
´ θ¯
pp
G′ (θ − pp)dF (θ) .
9The derivation is as follows, Ua(θ˜) = Up(θ˜) =⇒ θ˜G(θ˜) +
´ w¯
θ˜ wdG(w) − pa = G(θ˜ − pp)(θ˜ − pp) +´ w¯
θ˜−pp wdG(w). Then pa = θ˜G(θ˜)−G(θ˜ − pp)(θ˜ − pp)−
´ θ˜
θ˜−pp wdG(w). As a result, pa =
´ θ˜
θ˜−pp G(w)dw.
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To summarize, that means all consumers with θ ≥ θ˜ will choose to buy at date 0. Consumers
with θ ≤ pp will not consume at all. The rest will buy at date 1 if no better alternative arises.
By total differentiation of equation (1.3.6),
dθ˜
dpa
=
1
G(θ˜)−G(θ˜ − pp)
> 0
dθ˜
dpp
=− G(θ˜ − pp)
G(θ˜)−G(θ˜ − pp)
< 0
As expected, a higher ex-ante price will shift some consumers from ex-ante to ex-post market.
But other than shifting some consumers from ex-post to ex-ante, a higher ex-post price will also
reduce the total number of potential consumer, as consumers with θ ≤ pp will not consume at
all.
The profit function of the monopolist which opens both ex-ante and ex-post market is
π = pa
(
1−F(θ˜)
)
− c
ˆ θ¯
θ˜
G(θ)dF (θ)+(pp− c)
ˆ θ˜
pp
G(θ − pp)dF (θ)
where θ˜ is given by equation (1.3.6). In the following lemma, I assert that the interior solution
is the optimal. Besides, there are four corner solutions, i) pa = 0, ii) pp = 0, iii) pa being so
high that no one buy at date 0, where θ˜ = θ¯ , iv) pp being so high that no one buy at date 1,
where θ˜ = pp. The first two cases are clearly not optimal as it gives zero profit. I will also show
that the third and fourth corner solutions are not optimal in lemma 1.4 and lemma 1.5.
Lemma 1.3. The profit maximizing (pa, pp) and the cutoff θ˜ satisfy
pa =
(
c+
1−F(θ˜)
F ′(θ˜)
)(
G(θ˜)−G(θ˜ − pp)
)
+ ppG(θ˜ − pp), (1.3.7)
pa =
ˆ θ˜
θ˜−pp
G(w)dw,
pp = c+
(
1−F(θ˜)
)
G(θ˜ − pp)+
´ θ˜
pp
G(θ − pp)dF (θ)
´ θ˜
pp
G′ (θ − pp)dF (θ)
. (1.3.8)
Proof. The first order condition for profit maximization with respect to pa is
1−F(θ˜)+
(
c+
ppG(θ˜ − pp)− pa
G(θ˜)−G(θ˜ − pp)
)
F ′(θ˜) = 0.
With some manipulation, we get equation (1.3.7). The first order condition for pp is
10
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(
pa− cG(θ˜)
)
G(θ˜ − pp)F ′(θ˜)
G(θ˜)−G(θ˜ − pp)
+
ˆ θ˜
pp
G(θ − pp)dF (θ)
− (pp− c)
(
G(θ˜ − pp)2F ′(θ˜)
G(θ˜)−G(θ˜ − pp)
+
ˆ θ˜
pp
G′ (θ − pp)dF (θ)
)
= 0. (1.3.9)
Substitute equation (1.3.7) into equation (1.3.9) to obtain
[
cF ′(θ˜)+1−F(θ˜)
]
G(θ˜ − pp)+ ppG(θ˜ − pp)
2F ′(θ˜)
G(θ˜)−G(θ˜ − pp)
− cG(θ˜)G(θ˜ − pp)F
′(θ˜)
G(θ˜)−G(θ˜ − pp)
+
ˆ θ˜
pp
G(θ − pp)dF (θ)− ppG(θ˜ − pp)
2F ′(θ˜)
G(θ˜)−G(θ˜ − pp)
− pp
ˆ θ˜
pp
G′ (θ − pp)dF (θ)
+
cG(θ˜ − pp)2F ′(θ˜)
G(θ˜)−G(θ˜ − pp)
+ c
ˆ θ˜
pp
G′ (θ − pp)dF (θ) = 0.
Multiply the first term cF ′(θ˜)G(θ˜ − pp) by G(θ˜)−G(θ˜−pp)G(θ˜)−G(θ˜−pp) , then it can be canceled with the third
and seventh terms. Hence
(
1−F(θ˜)
)
G(θ˜ − pp)+
ˆ θ˜
pp
G(θ − pp)dF (θ) = (pp− c)
ˆ θ˜
pp
G′ (θ − pp)dF (θ) ,
which implies equation (1.3.8).
Lemma 1.4. There exists a pair of (pa, pp)which ex-ante and ex-post market demand is positive
and yields the same profit as the optimal ex-ante pricing scheme.
Proof. Define p¯p as the limit ex-post price such that ex-post demand is zero (θ˜ = pp), given
pa = p∗a as in equation (1.3.3).
ˆ p¯p
0
G(wi)dwi = p∗a.
Then I can show
∂π (p∗a, pp)
∂ pp
∣∣∣∣
pp=p¯p
= 0.
The last equation can be easily obtained by inserting θ˜ = pp into equation (1.3.9). That implies
operate in both markets is weakly better than only operate in the ex-ante one.
Lemma 1.5. There exists a pair of (pa, pp) which both ex-ante and ex-post market demand is
positive and yields the same profit as the optimal ex-post pricing scheme, if F ′(θ¯) = 0.
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Proof. Define p¯a as the limit ex-ante price such that ex-ante demand is zero (θ˜ = θ¯ ), given
pp = p∗p as in equation (1.3.5).
ˆ θ¯
θ¯−p∗p
G(w)dw= p¯a.
Then I can show
∂π
(
pa, p∗p
)
∂ pa
∣∣∣∣∣
pa=p¯a
= F ′(θ¯)
⎛⎝c+ p∗pG(θ¯ − p∗p)−
´ θ¯
θ¯−p∗p G(w)dw
G(θ¯)−G(θ¯ − p∗p)
⎞⎠ .
= F ′(θ¯)
⎛⎝c+ θ¯ +
´ θ¯
θ¯−p∗p wdG(w)
G(θ¯)−G(θ¯ − p∗p)
⎞⎠≥ 0
If F ′(θ¯) = 0, the last equation will be equal to zero. That implies operate in both markets is
weakly better than only operate in the ex-post one.
Corollary 1.1. If F ′(θ¯)> 0, operating only the ex-post (date 1) market is profit maximizing.
Proof. If F ′(θ¯) > 0, ∂π(pa,p
∗
p)
∂ pa
∣∣∣∣
pa=p¯a
> 0. That implies that by increasing the ex-ante price to
the limit level, essentially closing down the ex-ante market, the seller earns more.
By now, we have all the components needed for the proof of proposition 1.1,
Proof. As shown in lemma 4 and 5, the profit of a monopolist who operates in a pure ex-ante
or ex-post market can be replicated by a pair of (pa, pp) where both markets are open, yet those
pairs of (pa, pp) are not the optimized one, thus the optimal pricing scheme is the one which
yields positive demand on both markets.
1.4 Mixed Payment and Price Discrimination
In this section, we consider the general case when the seller is allowed to practice mixed
payment and price discrimination. As a result, mechanism design approach is adopted to ana-
lyze the model. From now on, given a pair of (pa, pp), the total price the consumer need to pay
if he chooses to consume, is the sum of pa and pp. Hence, the expected utility of the consumer
of type θ , if he decides to buy, is
U (θ) = (θ − pp)G(θ − pp)+
ˆ w¯
θ−pp
wdG(w)− pa
= w¯−
ˆ w¯
θ−pp
G(w)dw− pa.
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With this formulation, the monopolist sells by mixed payment. Although I assume the discount
rate to be zero, consumers still have a preference of the timing of payment. To see it, we can
compute the marginal rate of substitution (MRS),
MRS=− dpa
dpp
∣∣∣∣
U=U¯
= G(θ − pp) .
Firstly we see that, pa and pp are not perfect substitute, as the MRS is not a constant. A
higher pp implies a lower MRS, while pa plays no role in the MRS. Secondly, consumer with
higher θ has higher MRS. For any increment of pp, consumers with higher θ require more
reduction of pa to be indifferent. This points out that, it costs less to ask consumers with higher
θ to pay by pa, instead of pp.
To analyze the problem in the general way, another set of variables for the payments is de-
fined. At date 0, after learning his type, consumer reports his type θ at the ex-ante stage and
paying t0(θˆ) as the entry fee. At date 1, each consumer reports his realized w and make a
payment t1(θˆ , wˆ) to the monopolist. Before any announcements is made by the consumer, the
monopolist commits to a mechanism
{
t0(θˆ), t1(θˆ , wˆ)
}
. Define t = t0+ t1. A consumer’s real-
ized net surplus is u= θ−t, if he consumes. The monopolist’s profit is π = t−c. A consumer’s
pure strategy is a collection of functions θˆ (θ) ∈ [0, θ¯ ] and wˆ(θˆ ,θ ,w) ∈ [0, w¯] describing how
previous announcements and information map into announcements.
Since the final choice of the consumer is binary, either buy or not. By taxation principle,
there is no loss of generality to assume that 10
t1(θˆ , wˆ) =
⎧⎨⎩tb(θˆ) if buy,tn(θˆ) otherwise.
It suggests that the exact amount of w does not mean too much to the seller. The seller can do
just as well as he does not ask for the reporting of w, but letting consumers to choose among
the schedules. Note that when tn(θˆ) ≤ 0, there is refund to the consumer who chooses not to
consume. Define
T (θ) = t0 (θ)+ tn (θ)
as the total price paid for those choose not to consume and
p(θ) = tb (θ)− tn (θ)
10Another way to understand is to consider the followings, assuming truth telling of θ , given any direct mecha-
nism {q(θ ,w) , t (θ ,w)}, since by definition q(θ ,w) is multiplicatively separable in both the utility and profit
function, the optimal solution of q(θ ,w) will have a cutoff, where one part of it goes to 1, the rest goes to 0.
Hence the resulting t (θ ,w) would boils downs to two values only.
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as the extra price for those choose to consume.11 For a consumer whose type is θ and announced
θˆ , he will consume if w≤ θ − p(θˆ).
1.4.1 Simple Cases
In this subsection, three simple cases will be analyzed, namely one type, one alternative, and no
alternative. Apart from paving the path to better understand the basics of the model, each of the
individual case is interesting in itself, and explains some phenomena. Readers with interest in
the general result can skip this subsection.
1.4.1.1 One Type
Consider there is only one type of consumer where θ is known. Example may be the service
being provided is linked to a good with a competitive market. In such a case, the resell value
of the good is unique, and hence the value of the service linked to it should also be fixed and
known. The maximization problem is stated as:
max
T,p
π = T +(p− c)G(θ − p)
s.t.U = (θ − p)G(θ − p)+
ˆ w¯
θ−p
wdG(w)−T ≥
ˆ w¯
0
wdG(w)
The participation constraint is binding and it can be simplified as
T =
ˆ θ−p
0
G(w)dw.
Thus the maximization problem can be rewritten as
max
p
π =
ˆ θ−p
0
G(w)dw+(p− c)G(θ − p) .
The first order condition gives us
p∗ = c,
where the second order condition boils downs to G′ (·) ≥ 0, which is satisfied by assumption.
Then we have
T ∗ =
ˆ θ−c
0
G(w)dw= π∗.
The solution is in the same spirit of classical two part tariff solution, where charging the
11Because T (θ) is the choice variable of the following analysis, which is a lumpsum term for the ex-ante payment
and the possible refunds. Hence our model will not give an unique solution of refunding.
14
1.4 Mixed Payment and Price Discrimination
marginal cost for usage, and let the fixed fee capture the surplus. The only difference is that
part of the surplus being captured is actually less than the consumer surplus θ − c.
Lemma 1.6. T ∗ < θ − c.
Proof.
θ − c−T ∗ = θ − c−
ˆ θ−c
0
G(w)dw=
ˆ θ−c
0
(1−G(w))dw> 0
This result is intuitive, as the consumer has an alternative, the maximum amount can be
extracted depends on the expected value of the alternative, which is determined by the G(·)
function. Thus the higher is the expected value of the alternative, the lower is the consumer
surplus can be extracted.
1.4.1.2 One Alternative
Now another extreme case is considered, where there is a known alternative w available to all
consumers. One possibility is that a big event is expected to be popular, like world cup, hence
it is known to both seller and consumers. As there is no unique optimal schedule of ex-ante and
ex-post prices in this case, another way of modeling is used. Define q(·) as the probability that
consumption takes place, and τ (·) as the total payment. The utility of the consumer is,
U (θ) = q(θ)θ +(1−q(θ))w− τ (θ) .
By the envelope theorem
U ′ (θ) = q(θ) .
With this equation and q′ (θ) ≥ 0, which is also the second order condition of the utility max-
imization problem, we have incentive compatibility for all θ . Since this is a standard result,
proof is omitted.
The profit function is
π =
ˆ θ¯
θ
(τ (θ)−q(θ)c)dF (θ)
=
ˆ θ¯
θ
q(θ)
(
θ −w− c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
dF (θ) .
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Thus the optimal q∗ (θ) is
q∗ (θ) =
⎧⎨⎩1 if θ −w− c−
1−F(θ)
F ′(θ) ≥ 0,
0 otherwise.
The interpretation of the condition of q∗ (θ) is similar to Bulow and Roberts (1989): the
seller’s alternative adjusted marginal revenue from the buyer with type θ and alternative w is
θ − 1−F(θ)F ′(θ) −w. The good is sold whenever this expression is greater the marginal cost c, and
the total revenue is the area under the alternative adjusted marginal revenue curve.
Define θ˜ as the marginal type such that θ˜ −w− 1−F(θ˜)
F ′(θ˜) = c . For all θ > θ˜ , the total payment
is
τ∗ (θ) = q(θ)(θ −w)−
ˆ θ
θ
q(x)dx
= (θ −w)−θ + θ˜
= θ˜ −w.
If we want to implement this equilibrium by the ex-ante price (T ) and ex-post price (p), we
have the indifference result.
Lemma 1.7. Both seller and consumers are indifferent to any {T (θ) , p(θ)}, given (i) T (θ)+
p(θ) = τ∗ (θ) and (ii) p(θ)≤ θ −w.
Proof. For all θ > θ˜ , q∗ (θ) = 1, under the current specification, the utility function can be
rewritten as U (θ) = θ − p(θ)−T (θ), provided that condition (ii) p(θ) ≤ θ −w is fulfilled,
which ensure that the consumer consume with certainty. With this and condition (i), both con-
sumers and sellers are indifferent to any {T (θ) , p(θ)}.
As a result, we do not have an unique optimal schedule of ex-ante and ex-post prices. This
points out that the ex-post price will affect the allocation, while ex-ante price is a lump sum
payment. Surprisingly, there are no restriction on p′ (θ) here, where we will see in the general
analysis, p′ (θ)≤ 0.
1.4.1.3 No Alternative
We can study the standard case with no alternative easily by setting w = 0 in the previous
case. Accordingly,
q∗ (θ) =
⎧⎨⎩1 if θ − c−
1−F(θ)
F ′(θ) ≥ 0
0 otherwise.
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Define θˆ as the marginal type such that θˆ − c− 1−F(θˆ)
F ′(θˆ) = 0. For all θ > θˆ , the resulting total
payment is
τ∗ (θ) = θˆ = c+
1−F(θˆ)
F ′(θˆ)
.
The standard theory suggests that, under the current setting, the monopoly seller will not prac-
tice price discrimination, where all consumers pay the same price.
1.4.2 Observable alternative
After seeing the three special cases, we are just one step towards the general analysis. In
the general problem, there are different types of consumers and each of them has an uncertain
alternative. In this subsection, we study a case where w is a public information, all else is the
same as the general problem. This will be used as a benchmark case, as it generates the same
expected profit for the seller in the general case. Apart from this, this case is also interesting
to study in itself, as it represents the situation where the seller observes the realized alternative,
example includes small village or under a well connected network of sellers and buyers.
Suppose the seller observes w, then we only need to consider incentive constraints for report-
ing θ . Consider the seller commits to a mechanism {q(θ ,w) ,τ (θ ,w)} before she observes w,
where q(θ ,w) is the probability of consumption takes place, and τ (θ ,w) is the transfer. The
expected utility of a consumer is
U
(
θ , θˆ
)
=
ˆ w¯
0
[
θq(θˆ ,w)+
(
1−q(θˆ ,w))w− τ(θˆ ,w)]dG(w)
=
ˆ w¯
0
[
w+(θ −w)q(θˆ ,w)− τ(θˆ ,w)]dG(w) . (1.4.1)
By the envelope theorem,
U ′ (θ) =
ˆ w¯
0
q(θ ,w)dG(w) .
Integrating over θ , we obtain
U (θ) =
ˆ θ
θ
ˆ w¯
0
q(x,w)dG(w)dx+U(θ)
=
ˆ θ
θ
ˆ w¯
0
q(x,w)dG(w)dx+
ˆ w¯
0
wdG(w) . (1.4.2)
The second order condition of the utility maximization problem boils downs to q(θ ,w) being
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increasing in θ . Using equation (1.4.1) and (1.4.2), we obtain
ˆ w¯
0
τ (θ ,w)dG(w) =
ˆ w¯
0
[
(θ −w)q(θ ,w)−
ˆ θ
θ
q(x,w)dx
]
dG(w) .
The profit function of the seller is
π =
ˆ θ¯
θ
ˆ w¯
0
(τ (θ ,w)− cq(θ ,w))dG(w)dF (θ)
=
ˆ θ¯
θ
ˆ w¯
0
(
(θ −w− c)q(θ ,w)−
ˆ θ
θ
q(x,w)dx
)
dG(w)dF (θ)
=
ˆ w¯
0
ˆ θ¯
θ
(
θ −w− c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
q(θ ,w)dF (θ)dG(w) .
The seller maximizes π by choosing q(θ ,w). The constraint to the problem is
´ w¯
0 q(θ ,w)dG(w)
is weakly increasing in θ . By pointwise maximization,
q∗ (θ ,w) =
⎧⎨⎩1 if θ −w− c−
1−F(θ)
F ′(θ) ≥ 0
0 otherwise.
(1.4.3)
By the standard assumption of decreasing hazard rate, q∗ (θ ,w) is increasing in θ , and hence
the constraint is satisfied. Define θ∼ (w) to be the lowest θ such that q
∗ (θ ,w) = 1, given w. From
equation (1.4.3),
θ∼−
1−F(θ∼)
F ′(θ∼)
= w+ c.
Because of the assumption of the decreasing hazard rate, θ∼ is increasing in w. Given any
(θ ,w) such that q∗ (θ ,w) = 0, the optimal transfer is τ∗ (θ ,w) = 0. Given any (θ ,w) such that
q∗ (θ ,w) = 1, the optimal transfer is
τ∗ (θ ,w) = (θ −w)−
ˆ θ
θ∼(w)
dx,
= θ∼ (w)−w
= c+
1−F(θ∼ (w))
F ′(θ∼ (w))
.
Because of the assumption of decreasing hazard rate and θ∼
′ (w) ≥ 0, τ∗ (θ ,w) is decreasing in
w. Note that the optimal transfer τ∗ (θ ,w) does not depend on θ , thus the payment is like a
lucky draw. The type θ matters only for whether the service will be delivered. As a result, the
18
1.4 Mixed Payment and Price Discrimination
maximized profit is
π∗ =
ˆ θ¯
θ
ˆ w¯
0
(
θ −w− c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
q∗ (θ ,w)dG(w)dF (θ)
=
ˆ θ¯
θ
ˆ θ−c− 1−F(θ)F ′(θ)
0
(
θ −w− c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
dG(w)dF (θ)
=
ˆ θ¯
θ
(
θ − c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
G
(
θ − c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
−
ˆ θ−c− 1−F(θ)F ′(θ)
0
w dG(w)dF (θ)
=
ˆ θ¯
θ
ˆ θ− 1−F(θ)F ′(θ) −c
0
G(w)dw dF (θ) . (1.4.4)
This profit should be a upper bound for the general problem where w is private information,
as the seller have a free access to the information about the alternatives. In what follows, I will
show that this profit can be attained by a simple pricing mechanism even when the seller does
not observe w.
1.4.3 General Analysis
In this section, I will study the general problem. I will show that the optimal mechanism can
be implemented by a simple two part tariff {T (θ) , p(θ)}, which depends only on the report
of the type. I will show that the seller can achieve the same expected profit as in the case of
alternative is observable to the seller. The only difference from the section 1.4.2 is that w is
private information and no longer observed by the seller. In the general problem, there are
a continuum of consumers having θ ∈ [θ , θ¯] and each of them has an uncertain alternative
w ∈ [0, w¯]. Both θ and w are private information to the consumer. The expected utility of a type
θ consumer who reports θˆ is
U(θ , θˆ) = G(θ − p(θˆ))(θ − p(θˆ))−T (θˆ)+
ˆ w¯
θ−p(θˆ)
wdG(w)
= w¯−T (θˆ)−
ˆ w¯
θ−p(θˆ)
G(w)dw. (1.4.5)
By the envelope theorem,
U ′ (θ) = G(θ − p(θ)) .
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Integrating over θ , we get:
U (θ) =
ˆ θ
θ
G(x− p(x))dx+U(θ)
=
ˆ θ
θ
G(x− p(x))dx+
ˆ w¯
0
wdG(w) . (1.4.6)
The second order condition of the utility maximization problem boils down to p′ (θ)≤ 0.12
Lemma 1.8. For all θ ∈ [θ , θ¯ ], U (·) and p(·) are incentive compatible if
U ′ (θ) = G(θ − p(θ))
p′ (θ)≤ 0
Proof. Assume to the contrary thatU(θ , θˆ)>U (θ ,θ), where θˆ 	= θ . This is equivalent to
0<
ˆ θˆ
θ
U2 (θ ,x)dx=
ˆ θˆ
θ
U2 (θ ,x)−U2 (x,x)dx=
ˆ θˆ
θ
ˆ θ
x
U12 (y,x)dydx,
where the first equality is using the fact thatU2 (θ ,θ) = 0. I can show that
U12 (y,x) =
∂G(y− p(x))
∂x
=−G′ (y− p(x)) p′ (x)≥ 0.
If θˆ > θ , x ≥ θ for all x ∈ [θ , θˆ ], and the inequality cannot hold. Similarly, if θˆ < θ , x ≤
θ for all x ∈ [θ , θˆ ], and again we obtain a contradiction.
By equation (1.4.5) and (1.4.6), we have
T (θ) =
ˆ θ−p(θ)
0
G(w)dw−
ˆ θ
θ
G(x− p(x))dx. (1.4.7)
Corollary 1.2. T ′ (θ)≥ 0.
Proof. Differentiate equation (1.4.7) with θ ,
T ′ (θ) =
(
1− p′ (θ))G(θ − p(θ))−G(θ − p(θ))
=−p′ (θ)G(θ − p(θ))≥ 0
We have the last inequality because p′ (θ)≤ 0.
From lemma 1.8, we have a p(θ) decreasing in θ , if we look for an incentive compatible
mechanism. Corollary 1.2 tells us that T (θ) is increasing in θ , given that p(θ) is decreasing in
12From the first order conditionU2 (θ ,θ) = 0, we haveU22 (θ ,θ) =−U12 (θ ,θ).
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θ . After seeing the general pattern for the prices, we can find out the optimal prices. But first
we need the profit function,
π =
ˆ θ
θ
(T (θ)+(p(θ)− c)G(θ − p(θ)))dF (θ)
=
ˆ θ
θ
[ˆ θ−p(θ)
0
G(w)dw−
ˆ θ
θ
G(x− p(x))dx+(p(θ)− c)G(θ − p(θ))
]
dF (θ) .
The second term can be rewritten as:
ˆ θ
θ
ˆ θ
θ
G(x− p(x))dxdF (θ) =
ˆ θ¯
θ
G(x− p(x))dx−
ˆ θ
θ
F (θ)G(θ − p(θ))dθ
=
ˆ θ¯
θ
(1−F (θ))G(θ − p(θ))dθ . (1.4.8)
With equation (1.4.8), profit can be written as
π =
ˆ θ
θ
[ˆ θ−p(θ)
0
G(w)dw+
(
p(θ)− c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
G(θ − p(θ))
]
dF (θ) .
As a result, the maximization problem can be stated as,
max
{p(·)}
π =
ˆ θ
θ
[ˆ θ−p(θ)
0
G(w)dw+
(
p(θ)− c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
G(θ − p(θ))
]
dF (θ) ,
s.t. p′ (θ)≤ 0,
U (θ)≥
ˆ w¯
0
wdG(w) , ∀θ .
Since U ′ (θ) = G(θ − p(θ)) ≥ 0, the participation constraint can be replaced by U(θ) =´ w¯
0 wdG(w), which can be shown as T (θ) =
´ θ−p(θ)
0 G(w)dw. Ignoring the two constraints,
by point-wise maximization,
p∗ (θ) = c+
1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
.
The second order condition boils downs to G′ (·)≥ 0, which is satisfied by assumption.
In order to satisfy the constraint p′ (θ) ≤ 0, we need the standard assumption for the haz-
ard rate, which is 1−F(θ)F ′(θ) is decreasing in θ . All convex F (·) satisfies this requirement, but
convexity is only sufficient but not necessary.13
13A sufficient and necessary condition is F (θ)< 1+ F
′(θ)
F ′′(θ) , ∀θ .
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Proposition 1.2. The profit maximizing mechanism is
p∗ (θ) = c+
1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
,
T ∗ (θ) =
ˆ θ−c− 1−F(θ)F ′(θ)
0
G(w)dw−
ˆ θ
θ
G
(
x− c− 1−F (x)
F ′ (x)
)
dx,
π∗ =
ˆ θ
θ
ˆ θ− 1−F(θ)F ′(θ) −c
0
G(w)dw dF (θ) . (1.4.9)
We can see that the profit maximizing p∗ (·) does not depend on the G(·). It is optimal
to charge customer at different times, partly ex-ante and partly ex-post, when they are facing
uncertain alternatives. With high valued customer pay mainly by ex-ante price, low valued
customer pay mainly by ex-post price. We have the usual no distortion at the top result, as
p∗(θ¯) = c. Then the corresponding probability of consumption is G(θ¯ − c), which is efficient.
However for all θ < θ¯ , there will be downward distortion of the probability of consumption.
From here it shows that, T (·) is a lump sum payment which have no effect on the allocation,
while p(·) has a important implication on allocation. The following is a concrete example:
Example 1.1. Uniform Distributions
Assume F (·) = θθ¯ , G(·) = ww , c= 0,
p∗ (θ) = θ¯ −θ ,
T ∗ (θ) =
2θθ¯ + θ¯ 2
2w¯
,
π∗ =
θ¯ 2
12w¯
.
By proposition 1.1, if we restrict to uniform pricing, the monopolist will sell at both pre-sale
and on spot market. If we open up the possibility of non-uniform pricing, we will still have on
spot market sales, with the condition explained in lemma 1.10. But the pure pre-sale option will
not be provided, as shown in lemma 1.9.
Lemma 1.9. The optimal selling mechanism do not include pure ex-ante payment options.
Proof. Since p(·) is decreasing in θ , and p(θ¯) = c. Thus there is no payment option which is
purely ex-ante.
Lemma 1.10. There are payment options which are purely ex-post, when (θ − c)F ′(θ)≤ 1.
Proof. Consider the optimal expected utility of θ ,
U(θ) = w¯−T (θ)−
ˆ w¯
θ−p(θ)
G(w)dw=
ˆ w¯
0
wdG(w) .
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Therefore,
T (θ) =
ˆ θ− 1F ′(θ)−c
0
G(w)dw.
When θ − 1F ′(θ) ≤ c, because by assumption G(w) = 0, ∀w ≤ 0, we have T (θ) = 0. Define
θ˜ such that θ˜ − 1−F(θ˜)
F ′(θ˜) = c, thus T (θ) = 0, ∀θ ∈ [θ , θ˜ ]. Since p′ (θ) ≤ 0, no one will choose
other payment options with T (θ) = 0, but only with
(
T (θ˜), p(θ˜)
)
=
(
0,c+ 1−F(θ˜)
F ′(θ˜)
)
.
With the interpretation of Bulow and Roberts (1989), θ− 1−F(θ)F ′(θ) is the marginal revenue from
consumer with value θ . The definition of θ˜ is indeed the standard condition where marginal
revenue equals marginal cost. By the decreasing hazard rate assumption, marginal revenue is
increasing in θ , thus for all θ ∈ [θ ,θ˜ ], marginal revenue is less than marginal cost. Hence they
are the portion of the market will not be served, and facing only with the alternative.
There are two ways to understand the condition (θ −c)F ′(θ)≤ 1: i) the lowest value is very
close to the marginal cost c; ii) there are very few people with the lowest value, and they have
different reasoning. The pure ex-post payment option is actually decided for consumer with
high uncertainty to consume, namely those with very low θ . The lower θ is, the more likely
we have those payment options. When F ′(θ) becomes lower, p(θ) becomes higher, since
U(θ) =
´ w¯
0 wdG(w) and
dT (θ)
dp(θ)
∣∣∣
U=U¯
= −G(θ − p(θ)) ≤ 0, we are more likely to have a pure
ex-post payment option.
Recall that in section 1.4.1, when there is only one certain alternative or no alternative, mo-
nopolist seller will not price discriminates consumers. The following two lemmas show clearly,
it will no longer be the case. With uncertain alternatives, monopolist seller price discriminates,
no matter in the realized sense or expected sense.
Lemma 1.11. The total price τ (θ) = p(θ)+T (θ) is decreasing in θ .
Proof. Define d
(
1−F(θ)
F ′(θ)
)/
dθ = δ (θ). By definition, the total price is
τ (θ) = c+
1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
+
ˆ θ−c− 1−F(θ)F ′(θ)
0
G(w)dw−
ˆ θ
θ
G
(
x− c+ 1−F (x)
F ′ (x)
)
dx.
Differentiate it with respect to θ ,
τ ′ (θ) = δ (θ)+(1−δ (θ))G
(
θ − c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
−G
(
θ − c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
= δ (θ)
(
1−G
(
θ − c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
))
≤ 0.
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Since high valued consumer pay mainly by ex-ante payment, I have a similar result as in
Eso˝ & Szentes (2007) and Nocke, Peitz & Rosar (2011), where there are discounts to ex-ante
payment.
Lemma 1.12. The expected total price Eτ (θ) =G(θ − p(θ)) p(θ)+T (θ) is increasing in θ .
Proof. Define d
(
1−F(θ)
F ′(θ)
)/
dθ = δ (θ). By definition, the expected total price is
Eτ (θ) = G
(
θ − c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)(
c+
1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
+
ˆ θ−c− 1−F(θ)F ′(θ)
0
G(w)dw
−
ˆ θ
θ
G
(
x− c+ 1−F (x)
F ′ (x)
)
dx.
Differentiate it with respect to θ ,
Eτ ′ (θ) = G′
(
θ − c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
(1−δ (θ))
(
c+
1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
+G
(
θ − c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
δ (θ)
+(1−δ (θ))G
(
θ − c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
−G
(
θ − c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
= G′
(
θ − c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
(1−δ (θ))
(
c+
1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
≥ 0.
Theorem 1.1. The profit maximizing mechanism gives the same outcome as the benchmark
case.
Proof. For the profit, equation (1.4.9) and (1.4.4) are exactly the same. For the allocation, recall
equation (1.4.3), q∗ (θ ,w) = 1 if θ − 1−F(θ)F ′(θ) − c≥ w. The probability of consumption, for type
θ , is G
(
θ − 1−F(θ)F ′(θ) − c
)
. Where in the profit maximizing mechanism, the consumer consumes
whenever w≤ θ − p(θ), which happens with probability G
(
θ − 1−F(θ)F ′(θ) − c
)
.
This result has some favor of the Theorem 1 of Eso˝ and Szentes (2007), where the seller’s
expected revenue is the same as if she could observe the “new” information. The main differ-
ences are listed as follows. First, the information structure is very different. In Eso˝ and Szentes
(2007), buyers get the second period signal to update the value for the object. However, in my
model, the value of the service is determined solely by the type of the buyer in the first period.
Hence the “new information” affects, in Eso˝ and Szentes (2007), the incentive compatibility
constraint, while in my model, w affects the participation constraint. Secondly, whether the
buyers get the addition signal in the second period is decided by the seller in Eso˝ and Szentes
(2007). In my model, it is just a matter of time, that w will be revealed to the consumer. Thirdly,
there is one indivisible object to sell in their model, while in my model, anyone can get the
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service provided that she pays the price. Fourthly, in the case of very high realization of w, for
example, w≥ θ¯ , the consumer will not consume the service no matter what the price is, unless
it goes negative. However in Eso˝ and Szentes (2007), the buyer with highest value will always
buy the good, the only difference is the price the buyer is willing to pay.
Theorem 1.2. The expected profit is higher when consumers face a more volatile alternative.
Proof. Consider a mean-preserving spread function of G(·), defined as Gˆ(·). The profit func-
tion becomes
π∗ =
ˆ θ
θ
ˆ θ−c− 1−F(θ)F ′(θ)
0
Gˆ(w)dwdF (θ) .
Since G(·) and Gˆ(·) cross only once, denote the crossing point as wˆ. Because of the mean-
preserving spread, Gˆ(·)> G(·), for all w< wˆ. Hence we get the result.
The intuition of this result can be understand as the seller is providing an insurance-like
service. If the consumer gets unlucky, a low realization of the alternative happens, she can
consume the service, on the other hand, lucky consumer will enjoy the high value alternative.
A mean-preserving spread smooths out and increase the density of the two ends. But the low
end is covered by the seller, hence it is only the high end has effect on the consumer well being.
As the expected utility of the consumer is higher, there is more surplus to extract. Thus the
expected profit is higher. One interpretation for this result is the different size or intensity of
social network. People having weak and limited linkage with other people are more likely to
face a more volatile alternative. On one hand, it is very likely nothing happens, given the size
of the social network. On the other hand, he will not be informed even if there is any, given
his halfhearted social network. As a result, the leftovers are big events that affect everyone, for
instance blackout or blizzard.
1.4.4 Standard formulation
In this section, I will formulate the problem with the standard mechanism design approach and
show that theorem 1 holds under the standard assumptions. The seller announces and commits
to a mechanism Γ= (q,τ) at date 0, where q(θˆ , wˆ) is the probability that consumer consumes,
τ(θˆ , wˆ) is the transfer to the seller. The consumer reports θˆ at date 0 and wˆ at date 1. By
backward induction, at date 1, the payoff of a consumer who observes (θ ,w) and reports (θˆ , wˆ)
is
u(w, wˆ;θ , θˆ) = θq(θˆ , wˆ)+w(1−q(θˆ , wˆ))− τ(θˆ , wˆ)
= w+(θ −w)q(θˆ , wˆ)− τ(θˆ , wˆ).
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The first order condition is
(θ −w)q2(θˆ , wˆ)− τ2(θˆ , wˆ) = 0. (1.4.10)
The second order condition for the optimal report of wˆ is q2(θˆ ,w)≤ 0. By the envelope theorem,
uw(w,w; θˆ) = 1−q(θˆ ,w).
Taking integration over w gives
u(w,w; θˆ) =
ˆ w
0
1−q(θˆ ,x)dx+u(0, θˆ). (1.4.11)
Lemma 1.13. The two stage mechanism is incentive compatible in the second round after the
truthful revelation in the first round, given q(θ ,w) is weakly decreasing in w and
u(w,w;θ)−u(wˆ, wˆ;θ) =
ˆ w
wˆ
1−q(θ ,x)dx. (1.4.12)
Proof. Equation (1.4.12) is derived from equation (1.4.11). From the definition of consumer
payoff, we have
u(w, wˆ;θ) = u(wˆ, wˆ;θ)+(w− wˆ)(1−q(θ , wˆ)) .
Incentive compatibility in the second stage requires u(w, wˆ;θ) ≤ u(w,w;θ), where we rewrite
the difference as
u(w, wˆ;θ)−u(w,w;θ) = [u(w, wˆ;θ)−u(wˆ, wˆ;θ)]− [u(w,w;θ)−u(wˆ, wˆ;θ)] .
By definition, we know the terms in the first square bracket equals to (w− wˆ)(1−q(θ , wˆ)).
From equation (1.4.12), the terms in the second square bracket equals to
ˆ w
wˆ
1−q(θ ,x)dx≥
ˆ w
wˆ
1−q(θ , wˆ)dx= (w− wˆ)(1−q(θ , wˆ)) .
Because q2(θˆ ,w) ≤ 0, the inequality holds. Hence deviating to report any wˆ 	= w is not prof-
itable.
To complete the analysis, we need to consider the first stage incentive to report truthfully.
From equation (1.4.10), we have an implicit function of the optimal report wˆ given (θ , θˆ ,w),
denote this by wˆ = σ(θ , θˆ ,w). Hence in the first stage, the expected payoff of a consumer of
type θ and reports θˆ is
U(θ , θˆ) =
ˆ w¯
0
w+(θ −w)q(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))− τ(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))dG(w) .
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By the envelope theorem and implicit differentiation,
U ′ (θ)=
ˆ w¯
0
[
q(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))− (θ −w)q2(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))
2− τ2(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))q2(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))
(θ −w)q22(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))− τ22(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))
]
dG(w) .
The second term in the square bracket equals zero because of equation (1.4.10). Hence the
expect payoff of consumer type θ is
U (θ) =
ˆ θ
θ
ˆ w¯
0
q(x,σ (x,x,w))dG(w)dx+U (θ)
=
ˆ θ
θ
ˆ w¯
0
q(x,w)dG(w)dx+U (θ) . (1.4.13)
The second equality follows from lemma 1.13, where it is incentive compatible to report the true
w after a truth report of θ . By the standard argument, we know that it is incentive compatible
to report the truth in first stage given i) q(θ ,w) is weakly increasing in θ and ii) U ′ (θ) =´ w¯
0 q(θ ,w)dG(w). Equation (1.4.13) is the expected payoff of type θ consumer, and it is same
as the one in the observable w case which is equation (1.4.2). Hence the seller’s expect profit is
the same as in the observable w case, which we have already shown in theorem 1.1.
1.4.5 Behavioral Deviation
In all sections above, consumers are perfectly rational. Recent studies in behavioral and ex-
perimental economics show that this is not always true. The advance payment separates or
“decouples” the purchase from the consumption and in so doing seems to reduce the perceived
cost of the activity (Gourvile and Soman 1998). Most telephone customers choose a flat rate
service even though paying by the call would cost them less (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998).
These studies are related to my paper in spirit, yet we look at different problems. A related be-
havioral deviation is to consider consumer have over-focus problem. Very often, when people
are planning for the future, most of the attention is placed on the targeted activity, as a result
insufficient consideration is given to the possible alternative events that may happen. In the
extreme case, people disregard any other possible events, like sickness or accident, that may
happen which prevent them from proceeding with their plan. It is not as unusual as it seems,
people often get shocked when these alternative events happen, as if they are not expected to
happen at all. I believe you can find examples of this kind easily from your daily life.
To model this, an extra term ψ is introduced, which is the probability that the alternative is
neglected. The probability ψ can be understood as the reduced form of the complete model
for the over-focus problem, which is abstract from here.14 As a result, the expected value
from the alternative is ψw at date 0. Assume 0 < ψ ≤ 1. When ψ = 1, then consumers are
14A complete model should be the case where the decision maker faces costs of acquiring, absorbing, and pro-
cessing information, like Reis 2006.
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perfectly aware of their future opportunity. When it converges to zero, consumers are basically
over-focusing on the service, completely ignoring the alternative. It should be noted that this is
different from discounting the future value. The only thing being “discounted” is the alternative
but not the value of the service.15 A priori, over-focus problem lower the welfare of consumers,
because the consumer ignores possible alternatives, however this also lowering the price the
seller can charge on consumers. The overall effect is not clear and it is interesting to see what
will this brings. This subsection is devoted to the analysis of this irrationality, and I will show
that consumer benefits from this irrationality.
The expected utility perceived by the consumer, who has over-focus problem represented by
ψ , now becomes
U(θ , θˆ) =
ˆ w¯
0
[
θq(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))+ψw(1−q(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w)))− τ(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))]dG(w)
=
ˆ w¯
0
[
(θ −ψw)q(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))+ψw− τ(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))]dG(w) .
Where σ(θ , θˆ ,w) is the optimal report of wˆ as we have shown in the previous section, which is
an implicit function comes from equation (1.4.10). By the envelope theorem,
U ′ (θ)=
ˆ w¯
0
[
q(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))−
(
(θ −ψw)q2(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))− τ2(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))
)
q2(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))
(θ −w)q22(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))− τ22(θˆ ,σ(θ , θˆ ,w))
]
dG(w)
If ψ = 1, then we have the same equation as in the perfectly rational case. For all ψ < 1,
the second term in the square bracket is negative. The denominator is just the second or-
der condition of the optimal wˆ report, which is assumed to be negative. For the numerator,
(θ −ψw)q2(θˆ , wˆ)− τ2(θˆ , wˆ) ≤ 0 because q2(θˆ , wˆ) ≤ 0. Since q2(θˆ , wˆ) ≤ 0, the numerator is
positive. By lemma 1.13, σ(θ ,θ ,w) = w, taking integration over θ , we have
U (θ) =
ˆ θ
θ
ˆ w¯
0
[
q(x,w)− (x−ψw)q2(x,w)− τ2(x,w)q2(x,w)
(θ −w)q22(x,w)− τ22(x,w)
]
dG(w)dx+U (θ) . (1.4.14)
As a result, we have the following result.
Lemma 1.14. Consumers benefit from over-focusing.
Proof. In equation (1.4.14), the second term in the square bracket is negative, the expected
utility perceived by the consumer is higher in the irrational case than the rational case. The
actual utility must be higher than the one perceived by the consumer.
The intuition that consumers benefit by over-focusing is that the seller will charge a lower
price. With a lower ψ , given a q(·) and τ (·), the expected utility of the consumer is lower.
15One can also interpret ψ as the difference in discount factor between the alternative and the service, with the
normalization to one regarding the service.
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As a result, the participation constraint is tighten, hence the maximum price the seller could be
charged is lower.
1.4.6 Increasing Hazard rate
When the standard assumption of the hazard rate does not hold, i.e. 1−F(θ)F ′(θ) is increasing
in θ , the incentive constraint will be binding, p′ (·) = 0. Thus that implies, by corollary 2, a
constant p(·) and T (·). As a result, the maximization problem can be stated as follows,
max
T,p
π =
ˆ θ
θ
[T +(p− c)G(θ − p)]dF (θ) ,
s.t.U (θ) =
ˆ w¯
0
wdG(w) .
Since U (θ) = w¯− T − ´ w¯θ−pG(w)dw, the participation constraint can be rewritten as T =´ θ−p
0 G(w)dw. Hence, the maximization problem can be simplified as,
max
p
π =
ˆ θ
θ
[ˆ θ−p
0
G(w)dw+(p− c)G(θ − p)
]
dF (θ)
=
ˆ θ−p
0
G(w)dw+
ˆ θ
θ
(p− c)G(θ − p)dF (θ) .
The first order condition gives
p∗ = c+
´ θ
θ G(θ − p)dF (θ)−G(θ − p)´ θ
θ G
′ (θ − p)dF (θ)
,
where the second order condition is
G′ (θ − p)+
ˆ θ¯
θ
[
(p− c)G”(θ − p)−2G′ (θ − p)]dF (θ)≤ 0.
Thus the profit maximization mechanism is
p∗ = c+
´ θ
θ G(θ − p)dF (θ)−G(θ − p)´ θ
θ G
′ (θ − p)dF (θ)
,
T ∗ =
ˆ θ−p∗
0
G(w)dw.
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1.5 Correlated Alternatives
In this section, the independence assumption between θ andw is relaxed and we consider that
θ and w is positively correlated. Hence people whom have higher θ will have a higher chance
to get a higher valued alternative w. This can be interpret in two ways: i) More interested
customers have a higher taste for similar events; ii) Wealthy people have more access to higher
valued alternatives. The optimal ex-post price p∗ (·) will depend on the G(·), and is shown to
be lower than the independent case. The optimal ex-post price p∗ (·) will be decreasing in θ if
the correlation is not too strong, and the sufficient condition is G(·) being convex in w.
The distribution function of w now becomes G(w,θ). As before, I assume for all θ ∈ [θ ,θ],
G(0,θ) = 0, G(w¯,θ) = 1. I assume first order stochastic dominance (FSD ) for the function
G(w,θ) to represent the positive relationship.
Assumption. (FSD) G(w,θ)≥ G(w,θ ′) ,∀θ ′ ≥ θ .
The expected utility of a type θ consumer who reports θˆ is
U(θ , θˆ) = G(θ − p(θˆ),θ)(θ − p(θˆ))−T (θˆ)+
ˆ w¯
θ−p(θˆ)
wGw (w,θ)dw.
By the envelope theorem,
U ′(θ , θˆ) = (Gw+Gθ )(θ − p(θˆ))+G(θ − p(θˆ),θ)− (θ − p(θˆ))Gw+
ˆ w¯
θ−p(θˆ)
wGwθdw
= G(θ − p(θˆ),θ)+ w¯Gθ (w¯,θ)−
ˆ w¯
θ−p(θˆ)
Gθ (w,θ)dw
= G(θ − p(θˆ),θ)−
ˆ w¯
θ−p(θˆ)
Gθ (w,θ)dw.
Set θˆ = θ , integrating over θ ,
U (θ) =
ˆ θ
θ
G(x− p(x) ,x)dx−
ˆ θ
θ
ˆ w¯
x−p(x)
Gθ (w,x)dwdx+U(θ)
=
ˆ θ
θ
G(x− p(x) ,x)dx−
ˆ θ
θ
ˆ w¯
x−p(x)
Gθ (w,x)dwdx+
ˆ w¯
0
wGw(w,θ)dw. (1.5.1)
Lemma 1.15. For all θ ∈ [θ , θ¯ ], U (·) and p(·) are incentive compatible if
i)U ′ (θ) = G(θ − p(θ) ,θ)−
ˆ w¯
θ−p(θ)
Gθ (w,θ)dw,
ii) 0≥ p′ (θ)(Gw (θ − p(θ) ,θ)+Gθ (θ − p(θ) ,θ)) .
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Proof. Assume to the contrary thatU(θ , θˆ)>U (θ ,θ), where θˆ 	= θ . This is equivalent to
0<
ˆ θˆ
θ
U2 (θ ,x)dx=
ˆ θˆ
θ
U2 (θ ,x)−U2 (x,x)dx=
ˆ θˆ
θ
ˆ θ
x
U12 (y,x)dydx,
where the first equality is using the fact thatU2 (θ ,θ) = 0. We can show that
U12 (y,x) =
∂G(y− p(x) ,y)−´ w¯y−p(x)Gθ (w,y)dw
∂x
=−(Gw (y− p(x) ,x)+Gθ (y− p(x) ,x)) p′ (x)≥ 0.
If θˆ > θ , x ≥ θ for all x ∈ [θ , θˆ ], and the inequality cannot hold. Similarly, if θˆ < θ , x ≤
θ for all x ∈ [θ , θˆ ], and again we obtain a contradiction.
From above, we have the second order condition of the utility maximization problem: 16
p′ (θ)(Gw (θ − p(θ) ,θ)+Gθ (θ − p(θ) ,θ))≤ 0. (1.5.2)
Thus we have the following lemma,
Lemma 1.16. p′ (θ) and Gw (θ − p(θ) ,θ)+Gθ (θ − p(θ) ,θ) are of different sign.
From the assumption I made for theG(w,θ), for all w and θ , Gw (w,θ)≥ 0 andGθ (w,θ)≤ 0.
When interdependence is weak such that Gw (w,θ) ≥ −Gθ (w,θ), for all w and θ , we have a
price schedule decreasing in θ , as in the independent case. However when the interdependence
becomes too strong such that Gw (w,θ) ≤ −Gθ (w,θ), we have a price schedule increasing in
θ .
To derive the optimal pricing schedule, we need to do some manipulation to the profit func-
tion:
π =
ˆ θ
θ
(T (θ)+(p(θ)− c)G(θ − p(θ) ,θ))dF (θ) .
Since we know
T (θ) = (θ − p(θ))G(θ − p(θ) ,θ)+
ˆ w¯
θ−p(θ)
wGw (w,θ)dw−U (θ) ,
hence the profit function can now be written as
16From the first order conditionU2 (θ ,θ) = 0, we haveU22 (θ ,θ) =−U12 (θ ,θ).
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π =
ˆ θ
θ
[
(θ − c)G(θ − p(θ) ,θ)+
ˆ w¯
θ−p(θ)
wGw (w,θ)dw−
ˆ θ
θ
G(x− p(x) ,x)dx
+
ˆ θ
θ
ˆ w¯
x−p(x)
Gθ (w,x)dwdx−
ˆ w¯
0
wGw(w,θ)dw
]
dF (θ) .
By integration by parts, the third term can be rewritten as,
ˆ θ
θ
ˆ θ
θ
G(x− p(x) ,x)dxdF (θ) =
ˆ θ¯
θ
G(x− p(x) ,x)dx−
ˆ θ
θ
F (θ)G(θ − p(θ) ,θ)dθ
=
ˆ θ
θ
(1−F (θ))G(θ − p(θ) ,θ)dθ .
Similarly, the fourth term can be rewritten as
ˆ θ
θ
ˆ θ
θ
ˆ w¯
x−p(x)
Gθ (w,x)dwdxdF (θ) =
ˆ θ¯
θ
ˆ w¯
x−p(x)
Gθ (w,x)dwdx−
ˆ θ
θ
F (θ)
ˆ w¯
θ−p(θ)
Gθ (w,θ)dwdθ
=
ˆ θ
θ
(1−F (θ))
ˆ w¯
θ−p(θ)
Gθ (w,θ)dwdθ .
Thus the profit function can be rewritten as
π =
ˆ θ
θ
[(
θ − c− 1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)
G(θ − p(θ) ,θ)+
(
1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
)ˆ w¯
θ−p(θ)
Gθ (w,θ)dw
+
ˆ w¯
θ−p(θ)
wGw (w,θ)dw−
ˆ w¯
0
wGw(w,θ)dw
]
dF (θ) .
The first order condition with respect to p(θ) gives
p∗ (θ) = c+
1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
(
1+
Gθ (θ − p∗ (θ) ,θ)
Gw (θ − p∗ (θ) ,θ)
)
.
The second order condition is
(
p(θ)− c− 1−F(θ)F ′(θ)
)
Gww− 1−F(θ)F ′(θ) Gθw−Gw < 0. With the first
order condition, it can be rewritten as
1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
(
Gθ
Gw
Gww−Gθw
)
−Gw < 0. (1.5.3)
If we considerG(·, ·) be a convex function, the sufficient condition for second order condition
is GθGw ≤
Gwθ
Gww
. When p′ (θ) ≤ 0, GθGw ≥ −1, so the sufficient condition can be simplified into
−1 ≤ GwθGww . Which requires the correlation effect on Gw cannot be too weak. The condition
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boils down to −Gww ≤ Gwθ (θ¯ − p(θ¯), θ¯). As a result,
Proposition 1.3. When values are correlated, the profit maximizing mechanism is
p∗ (θ) = c+
1−F (θ)
F ′ (θ)
(
1+
Gθ (θ − p∗ (θ) ,θ)
Gw (θ − p∗ (θ) ,θ)
)
(1.5.4)
T ∗ (θ) = w¯−
ˆ w¯
θ−p∗(θ)
G(w,θ)dw−
ˆ θ
θ
G(x− p∗ (x) ,x)dx
+
ˆ θ
θ
ˆ w¯
x−p∗(x)
Gθ (w,x)dwdx−
ˆ w¯
0
wGw(w,θ)dw
To compare p∗ (θ) with the independent case, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1.17. Compare to the independent case, p∗ (θ) is lower in the correlated case.
Proof. By the second order condition of the utility maximization problem, equation (1.5.2), if
i) p′∗ (θ) ≤ 0, Gθ (θ − p∗ (θ) ,θ)+Gw (θ − p∗ (θ) ,θ) ≥ 0. Combined with Gθ ≤ 0, we have
−1≤ GθGw ≤ 0. If ii) p′∗ (θ)≥ 0, Gθ (θ − p∗ (θ) ,θ)+Gw (θ − p∗ (θ) ,θ)≤ 0. We have
Gθ
Gw
≤−1.
Thus p∗ (θ) is lower than the independent case.
From the proof, we get the following corollary directly.
Corollary 1.3. When p∗ (θ) is decreasing in θ , p∗ (θ) ≥ c. When p∗ (θ) is increasing in θ ,
p∗ (θ)≤ c.
The stronger the effect of Gθ , the lower is the p∗ (θ). As it just reflect that consumers hav-
ing higher expected value from the the uncertain alternative, thus less can be extracted. If
Gθ (w,θ) = 0 for all θ ,w, we get the same p(θ) as in the independent case. The structure of
the solution in this case is more complicated and only implicit form is obtained, which makes
the comparison of profit difficult.
In the standard analysis, p′ (θ) ≤ 0 only requires decreasing hazard rate. In this case, we
require more than just a decreasing hazard rate.
Lemma 1.18. Under the correlated case, with the decreasing hazard rate assumption, the opti-
mal p∗ (θ) is decreasing in θ if i) Gww ≥−Gwθ , ii) Gw ≥−Gθ and iii) Gθθ +Gww ≤−2Gθw.
Proof.
dp
dθ
=
[
(Gww+Gwθ )(c− p)+(Gw+Gθ )δ (θ)+ 1−F (θ)F ′ (θ) (Gθθ +2Gθw+Gww)
]
/− d
2π
dp2
Where δ (θ) = d 1−F(θ)F ′(θ)
/
dθ , by the decreasing hazard rate assumption, δ (θ) ≤ 0. By the
second order condition for the profit maximization problem, see equation (1.5.3), d2π
/
dp2 < 0.
To have a p′ (θ) ≤ 0, I need the denominator being negative. The first term is negative, since
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Gww ≥ −Gwθ and c ≤ p which is shown in corollary 1.3. The second term is also negative
because of the assumption of decreasing hazard rate and Gw ≥ −Gθ . For the last term, since
1−F(θ)
F ′(θ) ≥ 0, so the whole thing boils down to Gθθ +Gww ≤−2Gθw.
We know already condition ii) Gw ≥ −Gθ when p′ (θ) ≤ 0, is implied by the second order
condition of the utility maximization problem. Condition i) is actually implies by the second
order condition of the profit maximization problem if Gww ≥ 0, by equation (1.5.3), GθGw ≤
Gθw
Gww
.
Combine with condition ii) we have condition i). The only condition that is new is condition iii).
If we take the assumption of Gθθ = 0, where the probability decreases at a constant rate when θ
increases. Condition iii) becomes Gww ≤−2Gθw. Combine with condition i), we have−Gθw ≤
−2Gθw =⇒Gθw (θ − p∗ (θ) ,θ)≤ 0 for all θ . Since
´ w¯
0 Gw (w,θ)dw= 1,
´ w¯
0 Gwθ (w,θ)dw=
0. By continuity, this implies there are at least one w which Gwθ (w,θ) = 0. Define wˆ(θ)
such that Gwθ (wˆ,θ) = 0. For simplicity, we restrict our attention to those G(w,θ) which has
unique wˆ(θ). Since I assume Gww ≥ 0, condition iii) actually requires θ − p∗ (θ)≤ wˆ(θ). This
essentially means that we need the G(w,θ) put more mass towards high-end. As θ − p∗ (θ) is
increasing in θ , Gw with higher θ will be more skewed to the left. This is actually ensured by
the assumption of first order stochastic dominance of G(w,θ). As a result, lemma 16 can be
simplified as follows.
Lemma 1.19. Under the correlated case, with the decreasing hazard rate assumption, the op-
timal p∗ (θ) is decreasing in θ if G(w,θ) is convex in w and satisfies the first order stochastic
dominance in θ .
1.6 Literature Review
There are two lines of research most closely related to my model, one is about advance
purchase discount, another is about ticket sale. One common feature is that all papers I discuss
below contain individual demand uncertainty. For example consider any sport event, advance
booking triggers some consumer to buy in advance, shifting the competition for seats before the
event date (DeGraba, 1995). But in my model, “seats” are not limited. This insight introduces
the issue of the optimal timing of ticket sales, including the possibility of intertemporal price
discrimination where discounts are given to early purchase (Dana, 1998) or offers a menu of
options with varying upfront prices and levels of refund in the event of cancellation (Courty and
Li, 2000).
Courty and Li (2000) studied price discrimination where consumers with unit demand, know
at the time of contracting only the distribution of their true valuations but subsequently learn
their actual valuations. Consumers are sequentially screened, as in a menu of refund contracts.
Optimal mechanisms depend on informativeness of consumers’ initial knowledge about their
valuations, not on uncertainty that affects all consumers. If different types of consumers have
very different conditional distributions of valuations, then sequential mechanisms do not yields
34
1.6 Literature Review
much greater expected profits than ex-post monopolist pricing. It can be optimal to “subsidize”
consumers with smaller valuation uncertainty through low refund to reduce the rent to those
who face greater uncertainty and purchase more flexible contracts.
Escobari & Jindapon (2012) showed how an airline monopoly uses refundable and non-
refundable tickets to screen consumers who are uncertain about their travel. Their theoretical
model predicts that the difference between these two fares diminishes as individual demand
uncertainty is resolved. Using an original data set from U.S. airline markets, They find strong
evidence supporting their model. Price discrimination opportunities through refund contracts
decline as the departure date nears and individuals learn about their demand.
Courty (2003) studied the case of a monopoly ticket agency who sells tickets to consumers
who learn new information about their valuations over time. The monopolist can sell early to
uninformed consumers and/or late to informed ones, or it can choose to ration tickets and to
strategically allow some ticket holders to resell. He show that the following two strategies does
equally well: i) sell close to the event date after consumers have learned their valuations; ii)
sell early and allow resale. This shows that the selling date, the ticket supply, the ticket price,
and the decision to allow resale are complementary pricing instruments that should be chosen
jointly as part of a coherent ticketing strategy. I instead focus on the non-transferable service,
and hence reselling is not an issue.
Mo¨ller and Watanabe (2009) considers advance selling problems. They explains why some
goods (e.g. airline tickets) are sold cheap to early buyers, while others (e.g. theater tickets)
offer discounts to those who buy late. They derived the profit maximizing selling strategy for a
monopolist when aggregate demand is certain but buyers face uncertainty about their individual
demands. They have shown that Clearance Sales are more likely to be observed in markets
where (1) temporal capacity limits are difficult to implement, (2) marginal costs of capacity are
low but sufficiently increasing, (3) prices can be committed to in advance, (4) resale is feasible
and (5) rationing is random rather than efficient.
Nocke, Peitz & Rosar (2011) consider an intertemporal setting in which individual uncer-
tainty is resolved over time, advance purchase discounts can serve to price discriminate between
consumers with different expected valuations for the product. They characterize the profit maxi-
mizing pricing strategy of the monopolist. Furthermore, adopting a mechanism design perspec-
tive, they provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which advance purchase discounts
implement the monopolist’s optimal mechanism. This paper should be the one very closely
related to my model.
Rochet and Stole (2002) weakens the assumption of known reservation values by introducing
independent randomness into the agents’ outside options. They find that some of the received
wisdom from mechanism design and nonlinear pricing is not robust and the richer model which
allows for stochastic participation affords a more general empirical specification. There are two
main differences from my paper in terms of model, first their formulation does not incorporate
the random outside options into the utility function. Second, their model have no sequential
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nature.
Eso˝ and Szentes (2007) analyze a situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good
to risk-neutral buyers who only have an estimate of their private valuations. The seller can
release, without observing, certain additional signals that affect the buyers’ valuations. Their
main result is that in the expected revenue-maximizing mechanism, the seller makes available
all the information that she can, and her expected revenue is the same as if she could observe
the part of the information that is “new” to the buyers. They also show that this mechanism can
be implemented by handicap auction. In the case of a single buyer, this simplifies to a menu of
European call options, which is similar to what I did in this paper.
Due to the sequential structure of my paper, the allocation problem can be analyzed by the
dynamic mechanism design approach. However, there are two major differences between my
paper and the literature. First, by posting an ex-post price p(·), consumers can opt out in the
second stage, whereas in the literature they are forced to participate after the initial participation.
The usual argument for this practice is that, under a quasilinear environment with unlimited
transfers, the principal can ask the agent to post a sufficiently large bond upon acceptance, to
be repaid later, so as to make it unprofitable to quit and forfeit the bond at any time during the
mechanism. This points out exactly the second difference, which I explicitly model the “bond”
part, which is T (·) in my paper. I want to emphasizes that the role played by T (·) is also
different. Instead of keeping the consumer, T (·) is chosen to maximize profit subject to initial
participation. Below is the selected literature of dynamic mechanism design.
Eso˝ and Szentes (2013) is a more general version of the previous paper, where they considers
a general dynamic contracting problem with adverse selection and moral hazard, in which the
agent’s type stochastically evolves over time. The main result is that for any fixed decision-
action rule implemented by a mechanism, the maximal expected revenue that the principal can
obtain is the same as if the principal could observe the agent’s orthogonalized types after the
initial period. In this sense, the dynamic nature of the relationship is irrelevant: the agent only
receives information rents for her initial private information.
Pavan, Segal & Toikka (2014) study mechanism design in dynamic quasilinear environments
where private information arrives over time and decisions are made over multiple periods. They
provide a necessary condition for incentive compatibility that takes the form of an envelope
formula for the derivative of an agent’s equilibrium expected payoff with respect to his current
type. They characterize the transfers that satisfy the envelope formula and establish a sense in
which they are pinned down by the allocation rule.
1.7 Discussion
In this paper, I study the problem of timing of payment when consumers facing uncertain
alternatives. To see the relevancy of the results, let us go back to the motivating example in
the beginning of this paper. Typically each restaurant has a fixed number of tables, and that is
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the fundamental reason why restaurants can charge for the reservation. Although there is no
capacity constraint in my model, most of the implications are consistent with observations. The
price diners pay at the restaurant is not related to the alternative he might have, as predicted by
the model when θ and w are independent. However when the alternative is a similar restaurant,
this will no longer holds. Consider when there is a new restaurant opened nearby which provides
similar food and comparable level of service, the most likely response of the incumbent is to
provide discounts, which is consistent with the prediction that p is lower in the correlated case
than the independent case. More importantly, the recent trend of charging reservation confirms
that the optimal selling mechanism is of simple two part tariff pattern.
With the explosive growth of smart phones, more and more apps and reservation systems are
developed. To name a few: Table 8 in San Francisco sells reservations at popular restaurants
just days in advance; Zurvu scours the best available tables on OpenTable; Reserve, aims to be
a full-fledged digital concierge; SeatMe, allows restaurants to ping eager diners if tables open
up at the last minute. Resy, a service that sells reservations for tables at peak times. These
services, apart from being cheaper and more efficient than a human reservationist, can also give
restaurants access to more intimate portraits of their diners, like usual dining time and average
number of people to dine with. These information are relevant to assess the social network of
the diner. As predicted by the model, the restaurant will have a higher expected profit with a
diner having a more volatile alternative. Diners with a weak and limited social network are
more like to have more extreme realization of alternative. Personal data, like dining time and
average number of companion, are helpful to infer the size and intensity of someone’s social
network. Further empirical research can be conduct on whether restaurants really prefer diners
of this type.
There is a section devoted to the behavioral deviation where the consumer may overlook,
partly or completely, the possibility of having a future alternative. The analysis is based on a re-
duced form model which provides the most straightforward application of the developed result.
For future work, it is interesting to consider the full model where consumers need to allocate
limited amount of time to acquire and process the information between the targeted activity and
all possible alternatives. In general, consumers will have different amount of time or acquiring
and processing ability, hence results in a different level over-focus problem, denoted by ψ . Fur-
thermore ψ can be positively correlated with the value of the service, to represent the situation
where people give too much attention to the activity which they are enthusiast. In addition,
when the alternative is another restaurant, instead of treating it as an exogenous variable, the
model can be extended to formally consider the pricing strategy of the other restaurant. In that
case, diners have three choices, restaurant A or restaurant B or the alternative. More interesting
works are to be done.
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2 Legal Protection and Timing of
Payment
2.1 Introduction
In textbook discussions of voluntary exchange, agents trade until mutually beneficial terms
of trade are found. Goods then exchange hands and the agents go their respective ways. Sim-
ilarly, when money is used as a medium of exchange, the emphasis is on the market clearing
price, under which seller passes goods to the buyer and buyer passes money to the seller. The
implicit assumption is that seller receives his payment at the same time the buyer gets his goods.
This standard treatment is certainly a convenient abstraction, which allow economists focus on
development of various concept of marginal values. However it is a conception which ignores
the fact that agreement on a price is a different thing from the revenue collection of sellers and
goods acquisition of buyers.
In general, revenue collection vary from payment before to payment after the supply and
consumption of the goods or service. Most merchandise, for example, is purchased under what
I will call ex-ante payment schemes, where buyers must pay (or obtain credit) and acquire
ownership of the merchandise before the consumption take place. But in the case of many
personal services, supply and consumption precede payment. This type of payment I will call
ex-post payment schemes. Moreover payment scheme may differ within the same industry.
At fast food restaurants customers must pay before eating, but for most other restaurant, the
reverse is true.1 Other examples of payment schemes are practically as abundant as the number
of transactions in the economy. Labor markets typically involve ex-post payments, while many
professional services require that a portion of total payment pay in advance, with the balance
due after the service is supplied, which I will call mixed payment. The goal of this paper is to
derive some consistent economic principles which underlies the choice of ex-ante or ex-post
payment. Although there are a lot of works done dealing with optimal payment in the principal
1Recently there is a nice discussion on Quora (www.quora.com) about the optimal timing of the payment in
restaurant. One restaurant owner shared his experience, saying that upfront payment increased table turnover
by over 80%. The argument is that customers who have not paid can justify their occupation of a table, by the
mere possibility of further ordering. On the other hand, those who have pay will have no moral justification
for staying after their meals are finished. However, a higher table turnover does not necessarily associated with
higher profit. Another point being raised, is that tips must be pay afterward in order to grade the service, which
is one of the key reason why there should be ex-post payment.
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agent models, little work are found on how two parties will devise an efficient institutional
arrangements for the timing of payment.
One clear risk of using the ex-post payment scheme is buyer default. For example, in the
web design industry, the most common problem is that after presenting the work, clients take
it without paying. From the blog of Ben Hunt, who was one of the most influential figures
on the subject of effective web design.2 “While clients not paying has been a rarity in our
business experience (thankfully!), we’ve had 3 such cases in the last 6 months, which has caused
significant consequences for an agency of our size.”3. From his experience, he suggested that
it is actually mutually beneficial, to have the payments scheduled over time. On one hand, the
risk is managed, on the other hand, this provides you incentive to finish the work at the end. So
the problem he tries to solve is actually the two sided moral hazard problem.
If we take the contractual view of what seller offer, what really protect the trading parties
is the legal system. If there is any party breaches the contract, the innocent party can seek
compensation through litigation. Hence the legal system is significantly important to the trad-
ing parties. The difference of the legal environment can affect the attractiveness of a market.
A country’s law regulate business practices, defines business policies, rights and obligations
involved in business transactions. The government of a country defines the legal framework
within which firms do businesses. Therefore laws differ from country to country. For example,
China has Communists government where business laws are strictly controlled by government
to controlled business sectors. Where as India has democratic government and business laws
are made to protect small businesses and consumers. Although different countries have differ-
ent laws and regulations, knowledge of common law, civil law, contract laws, laws governing
property rights, product safety and liability for a country helps business people to make business
decisions.
The common law system is commonly found in former Great Britain’s colonies and is based
on country’s legal history, past court rulings on cases and ways in which laws are applied in spe-
cific situations. Judges in a common law system have power to interpret the law under unique
circumstances for an individual case. Countries like United States, Australia, India uses com-
mon law systems. In civil law system, laws are based on detailed set of written rules and codes.
Judges have less flexibility and have power only to apply the law. France, Germany, Russia
operate with a civil law system. Some counties have legal system, which is based on religious
teachings. Countries like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Middle Eastern nations follow Is-
lamic laws, which is based on holy principles of Koran. It is very important to interpret law
according to country and its impact on their commercial activities. Many business transactions
are regulated by contract, and contract law governs contract enforcement. Contracts drafted
under common law system are tend to be very detailed, where as contracts are much shorter and
less specific in civil law system due to already drafted civil codes. Therefore common law sys-
2 He has written three books and spoken at multiple conferences internationally.
3http://webdesignfromscratch.com/business/payment-timing-structure-tips/
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tem has long and expensive jurisdiction process. However it has advantage of greater flexibility
and allows judges to interpret a contract dispute in particular situation as compare to civil law
system. Considering impact of various aspects of legal system in business, it is very important
for business people to have good understanding of the legal system where they do business with.
Alongside the formal legal protection, the timing of payment is also an institutional device
being used to protect both parties from reneging on a promise. By having part of the payment
paid in advance, this reduces the loss to the seller in the case of buyer’s default of payment. Even
if the seller at the end chooses not to sue the buyer, the seller receives at least partly of the total
payment. On the other hand, by having part of the payment paid ex-post, this protects the buyer
from the seller’s malpractice of providing low quality of goods and service, because he can
refuse to pay the remaining part of payment. From this perspective, a mixed payment actually
mitigates the problem of the two sided moral problem. A interesting point is that both parties
want the timing of the payment shifts to their side, the buyer want to pay ex-post, while the
seller want to get paid ex-ante. Although this paper will not provide a solution for the optimal
mix of the payments, which is most likely done by bargaining, I show that mixed payment can
improve efficiency.
In this paper, I consider a trading of goods or service which quality is buyer-specific, and
communicates to the seller during the transaction. When the quality of the goods is of different
level, firms are disciplined by competition. Low quality goods or goods with highly variable
quality, sell for lower prices. But this requires that some sort of quality standard be agreed upon,
and that the quality be easily discernible. When the service rendered is highly personalized, it
will not be homogenous among sellers. In this case, the cost of renegotiating with alternative
sellers in order to avoid shirking is high and the discipline of competition is less relevant. Ex-
amples include photographers, construction work, professional services such as legal advice
and management consultancy, and creative work such as architectural design, the writing of
software, preparation of advertisements, and research and development.
Consider the simplest setting, where there are one principal and one agent. The agent is paid
to provide good or service, whose quality depends on his effort. So here we have a two sided
moral hazard problem. On one side, as long studied, principal worries agent shirks. While
on the other side, agent worries that principal not paying the agreed amount. To complete the
story, we need a third party, which is a court. In the case of dispute, either the seller complains
that amount paid is less than the agreed amount, or the buyer finds the quality is lower than
asked for, they can go to the court to seek a judgment. Surely there is no such thing as free
lunch, and using the court service is costly. The simplest way to represent this, is to consider
both party enter into a contest — completing to provide evidence that the other party commits
fraud.4 Apart from the variable cost, there are fixed costs. The fixed cost plays a key role in
the model, not only it is an important part of the legal environment which will be defined in
the model setup, but also one of the results shows that there is an optimal range of fixed cost to
4See Corcho´n, L. C. (2007).
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allow efficient outcome. This hints that reducing fixed cost of litigation need not be beneficial
to trade. Also the court efficiency will determine the feasible trading opportunity. A more
efficient legal system, as will be defined in the model setup section, will enlarge the feasible set
of contracting choice.
There are many different way to call the ex-post payment. Like in construction industry, a
contract that provides for Milestone Payments is one where payments are not scheduled by time
but by a ‘milestone’. This means that payments are due when a certain event or section of work
is reached. Typically contractors throwing extra staff and resources at the work with the aim
of reaching each milestone extra fast and being able to bank the cash fast. But very often there
is no payment at the end, because clients could argue about tiny details or that some particular
standard is not met. Clients will then simply terminate the contract. Now a part of the work
has been done in record time but with no cost, and clients will simply appoint someone else to
finish the work. So there is an advice that contractors should try their best to avoid this type of
payment scheme at all.5
This example seems to suggests that ex-post payment should not be welcomed by sellers. One
of the results in this paper seems to confirm this idea, where ex-ante payment dominates ex-post
payment. But it comes with an important condition, which is when the contract is proposed by
the seller. However, it seems that in the example above, it is the buyer who propose the contract.
Surprisingly, when the contract is proposed by the buyer, we have an equivalent result, ex-ante
and ex-post payment gives the same outcome, apart from the case where litigation involves very
low fixed cost. Nevertheless, the outcome may not be efficient. I showed that there exists two
kind of mixed payment scheme provides efficient outcomes when other schemes could not.
There may be a concern for the alternative solution for this problem, like seller offer guar-
antees. Reputation based approaches are not complete solutions, particularly for trading parties
who are new, small or distant from each other. Since payment terms can be selected to miti-
gate these concerns, I expect systematic relations between terms of payment and variable that
capture the potential for opportunism. In the next section, I will present the model. Then fol-
lowed by the analysis of litigation under different legal system. In section 2.4 and 2.5, ex-ante
and ex-post payment contract is examined in detail. A comparison between these two payment
contract is provided in section 2.6. Mixed payment contract is then introduced to the analysis in
section 2.7. The role of contract proposer will be shifted to the seller in section 2.8. Literature
review is provided in section 2.9. After discussion on some alternative explanation for different
payment contract is in section 2.10, section 2.11 concludes.
2.2 Model
I consider a simple trading relationship, one buyer trades with one seller. Both parties are
risk neutral. Production technology is linear, q = e where q is quality of the good or service
5Contractor debt recovery, http://www.contractorsdebtrecovery.com.au/articles/Milestones.pdf
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and e is effort. The buyer pays the price P for the good or service which seller incurs effort cost
e2/2+E to produce. E is the fixed cost to finish the basics, and e2/2 is the variable cost due to
the specific requirement of the buyer. The preferences are represented by the following utility
functions,
EUB = q−P+V,
EUS = P− e
2
2
−E+V,
where V is the expected values from litigation process which will be analyzed in the next sec-
tion. Consider a benchmark case which both parties cannot cheat, then there is no need to have
any litigation, henceV = 0. Clearly we have the efficient effort e˜= 1. As in the standard model,
the equilibrium quality is always below this first best level, but we will see that Principal would
always minimize the deadweight loss by choosing the more efficient scheme.
The timing of the model will be as follows: First, the buyer offers a contract to the seller,
which lists out ex-ante price Pante, required quality q, and ex-post price Ppost. Second, the seller
accepts or rejects the offer. Third, if the seller accepts, the seller receives Pante and chooses his
effort e; otherwise, the game ends. Fourth, the buyer chooses whether to fulfill the contract,
by deciding whether to pay Ppost. Fifth, if there is a dispute, either party can bring the case
to court. There is no private information and everything above is common knowledge. For
the contract which contains a zero ex-ante price or zero ex-post price, I will call that as pure
payment contract. For contracts contain positive ex-ante price and ex-post price, I refer them as
mixed payment contract. The time line of the model can be represented as follows:
B offers
contract
1
S accepts
or declines
2
S chooses
effort
3
B pays
or default
4
Litigation
5
Figure 2.2.1: Time line
In this paper, I adopt the “Perfect Tender Rule” in which the buyer is given the right to reject
the goods delivered or cancel the entire contract if the seller’s performance is non-conforming.6
Thus the buyer is given the right to terminate the contract for any deviation by the seller. As a
result, the effort choice of the seller will not be interior, the only possible choices are e= {0,q},
where q is the required quality.
6For more details regarding the “Perfect Tender Rule”, see appendix.
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2.3 Litigation
Now let us make clear the details for the litigation. In the case of dispute, there must be a
party which breaks the contract (first), which I call the defaulting party and the other one as
the innocent party. Denote the resource spend by i on litigation xi, where i, j = B,S which is
a shorthand notation for the buyer and seller. Party i is the innocent party, while party j is the
defaulting party. Let p
(
xi,x j
)
to be the probability that agent i wins, so 1− p(xi,x j) is the
probability that agent j wins, 7
p
(
xi,x j
)
=
αxi
αxi+ x j
.
Noted that there is a term α attached to xi. I assume α > 1, to represent the advantage enjoyed
by the innocent party. Another way to understand α is to consider it represents the efficiency
of the legal system. Under this interpretation, a more efficient legal system costs less for the
innocent party to achieve the same probability of winning the case. Apart from the variable cost
xi, there are fixed cost of litigation, which is denoted by K. Expert fees, document preparation
fees, and investigator fees add to the cost. In arbitration, filing fees can cost thousands and
the fee for arbitrators may easily cost thousands for each day of a hearing. In advance of trial,
mediation will cost $500 per half day, not including the attorney’s fees.
Certainly there are other indirect costs associated with the litigation. These indirect costs stem
from the uncertainty created by litigation, which may deter investment in high-cost jurisdictions.
They also may affect companies’ borrowing costs and hence their ability to invest, grow, and
create jobs. Concerns surrounding litigation can also occupy management time, which may
distort or hinder effective business decision making. Apart from that there are hidden costs,
like the personal cost and business stress. The business is stressed by occupying key personnel
time with the duties of litigation instead of their job responsibilities. Each day of trial will
occupy three days of each witness’s non-trial time. In addition, employee suffers from personal
stress over being a witness or being involved in the litigation or, in the worst case scenario,
being the object of a key portion of the litigation – either from their decisions or their actions.
All three of these initiators of stress carry direct costs – the loss of the employee’s services –
and indirect costs – the minimization of these employees. It is a rare employee indeed, who,
once accused of “causing” litigation whether by contract decisions, omissions, or direct action
is not chastened and therefore hesitant to act. This hesitation leads to indecision, inefficiency,
and loss. These costs are difficult to measure but are a significant expense nonetheless. On
the personal side, stress manifested as anger and anxiety are common occurrences. Add to that
the cloud of uncertainty that hangs over the individual as long as the litigation is unresolved.
7The literature has developed from the seminal contributions by Tullock (1967). The contest success function in
this paper is similar to the one in Gradstein (1995), with the exception that there is no restriction on α . For
more recent development about the contest success function, see Corcho´n, L., & Dahm, M. (2010).
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Combined this equals an emotional, and physical toll that must be added to the financial cost of
litigation.
All these factors are too complicated to put into one single model, although they are highly
important and relevant, I will not include them as this will certainly make the model too messy
to analyze. Certainly one put some of them into analysis, but before that, I believe an under-
standing of the basic mechanism behind all these other factors is essential for us to know how
contracts with different timing of payment will affect the decision makers.
2.3.1 US system
Throughout this paper, we will focus on the US legal system, where each party is responsible
for its own spending in court.8 9 The expected value from litigation is
Vi =C · p
(
xi,x j
)− xi−K,
Vj =−C · p
(
xi,x j
)− x j−K,
where C denotes the compensation paid by the losing party to the winning party, K is the fixed
cost of litigation. In the case of buyer default, the compensation would be Ppost.10 In the case
of seller default, the compensation would be Pante, which would leaves buyer not damaged.11
Simple differentiation give us the following first order conditions,
C
αx j(
αxi+ x j
)2 = 1,
C
αxi(
αxi+ x j
)2 = 1.
This implies the following lemma, define x∗i ,x∗j as the equilibrium litigation spending of party i
and j respectively:
Lemma 2.1. In equilibrium, the two parties spend the same amount on litigation.
8For reader interested in seeing different legal system, there is an analysis of the UK system in the appendix.
9The contest literature has developed from the seminal contributions by Tullock (1967). Corcho´n, L (2007)
provides a good survey about theory of contest.
10This compensation is according to the expectation damage principle. Under the expectation damage measure,
the defaulting party pays an amount that puts the other party in the position he would have been in had the
contract been performed. For details, see Shavell (1980).
11This compensation is according to the restitution damage principle. Under the restitution damage measure the
defaulting party returns only the payments made to him. See Shavell (1980).
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x∗i = x
∗
j =
αC
(1+α)2
.
Both parties will spend more to compete for a higher compensation (when C is higher),
and less when the legal system is more efficient (when α is higher). Thus in equilibrium, the
probability of i winning is
p∗
(
x∗i ,x
∗
j
)
=
α
1+α
.
The equilibrium expected value from litigation is
V ∗i =
α
1+α
C− α
(1+α)2
C−K
= p∗
2
C−K.
V ∗j =−C
α
1+α
− α
(1+α)2
C−K
=−Cα (2+α)
(1+α)2
−K.
Noted that we have a cutoff for litigation decision, the innocent party will sue if and only if
K ≤ p∗2C. I assume that K represents all fixed costs associated with the litigation whether the
defendant admits or defenses, so K is not relevant in the decision to admits or defenses. Since
V ∗j >−C, it is always in the interest of the defaulting party to fight the legal battle.
2.3.1.1 Comparative Statics
We can see how changes in α andC affect the litigation,
∂ p∗
∂α
=
1
(1+α)2
> 0.
The innocent party winning probability increases with the efficiency of the legal system. Notice
that V ∗i = p∗
2
C, it is obvious that V ∗i increases in both α and C. With the previous calculation,
it is easy to get,
∂V ∗j
∂α
=−C 2
(1+α)3
< 0,
∂V ∗j
∂C
=−α (α+2)
(1+α)2
< 0.
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Lemma 2.2. In terms of absolute value, the innocent party has a stronger marginal effect in
changes of α , but weaker in changes of C.
Proof.
∂V ∗i
∂α
=
2αC
(1+α)3
>
2C
(1+α)3
=
∣∣∣∣∂V ∗j∂α
∣∣∣∣ ,
∂V ∗i
∂C
=
(
α
(1+α)
)2
<
α (α+2)
(1+α)2
=
∣∣∣∣∂V ∗j∂C
∣∣∣∣ .
2.4 Ex-ante Payment
Let us firstly consider the case where the contract only involves ex-ante payment. After
the buyer makes the payment, the seller chooses to shirk or not. If the seller shirks, the buyer
chooses to sue or not. The buyer will sue if
K ≤ p∗2Pante = Pante
(
α
1+α
)2
.
As a consequence, Pante need to be sufficiently large to induce buyer to sue. When forming the
optimal ex-ante contract, this condition must be met. Otherwise, any Pante lower than K/p∗
2 is
like a gift to the seller, because the buyer will not find it beneficiary to sue. The expected utility
of the seller is
EUS =
⎧⎨⎩Pante−
e˜2
2 , if the seller works;
Pante− α(2+α)(1+α)2 Pante−K, if the seller shirks.
To induce the seller to exert required effort, we need
α(2+α)
(1+α)2
Pante+K ≥ e˜
2
2
.
The whole problem can be formulated as follows,
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e
P
PC
IC
break evenLC
Figure 2.4.1: Constraints for ex-ante payment contract
For the region below the red curve, PC is satisfied. For the region below the blue curve, IC is
satisfied. For the region to the right of the teal curve, LC is satisfied. The buyer will not offer
any (P,e) below the breakeven line.
max
e˜,Pante
e˜−Pante
s.t.
α(2+α)
(1+α)2
Pante+K ≥ e˜
2
2
, (IC)
Pante− e˜
2
2
≥ 0, (PC)
Pante ≥ K
(
1+α
α
)2
, (LC)
where equation (IC) is the incentive compatibility constraint of the seller, equation (PC) is the
participation constraint of the seller, and equation (LC) is the legal constraint for buyer to sue
seller, if seller shirks.
There are four types of contract where either IC or PC binds, or both and when the LC and PC
binds. It is impossible for none of constraints to be binding, due to the maximization behavior,
as shown clearly in figure 2.4.1. The indifference curves of the buyer is the 45 degree line. The
optimal solution depends on the intersection point of the three curves IC, PC and LC. Consider
the extreme case when K = 0, under this case, IC will be underneath PC, LC is on the vertical
axis, the only possible tangent point is on the IC. Thus we should expect when K is low, we will
only have IC binding, which is case I in the following analysis. When K increases, IC shifts up
vertically, and LC shifts right horizontally, leaving PC unchanged. If the tangent point is still
on the right of the intersection point of IC and PC, case I follows. If it happens to be at the
intersection point of IC and PC, where both IC and PC is binding, then we have case II. When it
happens to be the left of the intersection point, where PC is binding, we have case III. The last
case, is when K becomes really high, such that the solution is determined by the intersection
point of PC and LC.
Before we dive into the analysis of the different cases in details, the result is provided first.
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The optimal ex-ante payment contracts is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. The optimal choice of the ex-ante payment contract depends on the specific
legal environment, (α,K), which is summarized in the following table.
Case (α,K) e∗ P∗ante
I 0≤ K ≤ α2(2+α)2
2(1+α)6
α(2+α)
(1+α)2
α(2+α)
2(1+α)2 −K
(1+α)2
α(2+α)
II α
2(2+α)2
2(1+α)6
≤ K ≤ 1
2(1+α)2
√
2K (1+α) K (1+α)2
III 1
2(1+α)2
≤ K ≤ α2
2(1+α)2
1 1/2
IV α
2
2(1+α)2
≤ K ≤ 2α2
(1+α)2
√
2K
(1+α
α
)
K
(1+α
α
)2
To sum up, these four type of contracts correspond with different fixed litigation cost, from
low to high, it starts with case I, and finally case IV. This also gives an idea of optimal range K
for efficient contracting, with a given α .
Corollary 2.1. When the fixed cost of litigation is either too high or too low, the efficient con-
tract (case III) will not be offered.
Proof. See Lemma 2.10.
In what follows each of the four cases will be analyzed in detail, readers who have no interest
in the derivation can skip to the next section.
2.4.1 Case I (Incentive compatibility constraint binds)
Let us consider firstly where only the IC constraint binds. The maximization problem is
max
e˜,Pante
e˜−Pante s.t. α(2+α)
(1+α)2
Pante+K =
e˜2
2
.
Hence,
e˜∗ =
α(2+α)
(1+α)2
,
P∗ante =
α(2+α)
2(1+α)2
−K (1+α)
2
α(2+α)
.
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K
α1
0
(LC)
(IC)
Break even
Figure 2.4.2: Optimal choice of ex-ante payment contract
For the region below the red dashed curve, the case I contract will be chosen; For the region
between the red dashed curve and the lower green curve (2.4.3), case II contract will be offered.
For the region between the two green curves (2.4.3 and 2.4.4), the case III contract will be
chosen; For the region between the upper green curve (2.4.4) and the teal curve (2.4.5), the
case IV contract will be offered.
In equilibrium,
EU∗B =
α(2+α)
2(1+α)2
+K
(1+α)2
α(2+α)
> 0,
EU∗S =
α(2+α)
2(1+α)2
−K (1+α)
2
α(2+α)
− α
2(2+α)2
2(1+α)4
=
α(2+α)
2(1+α)4
−K (1+α)
2
α(2+α)
.
The PC is satisfied if and only if:
EUS ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ α
2(2+α)2
2(1+α)6
≥ K. (2.4.1)
For the buyer sues the seller when the latter shirks, we need the LC being satisfied,
K ≤
(
α
1+α
)2
Pante =
α3(2+α)
2(1+α)4
−K α
(2+α)
⇐⇒ K ≤ α
3(2+α)2
4(1+α)5
.
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It can be shown that equation (2.4.1) is more stringent, as we have
α2(2+α)2
2(1+α)6
<
α3(2+α)2
4(1+α)5
,
where the inequality is a consequence of 11+α <
α
2 . Since α > 1, the inequality is true. Thus the
only condition is the one satisfies PC. To summarizes,
Lemma 2.3. When K ≤ α2(2+α)22(1+α)6 , the optimal pure ex-ante payment contract will be,
e˜∗ =
α(2+α)
(1+α)2
, P∗ante =
α(2+α)
2(1+α)2
−K (1+α)
2
α(2+α)
.
The following three lemmas are the comparative statics with respect to K and α .
Lemma 2.4. The optimal e˜∗ and P∗ante are increasing in α . P∗ante is decreasing in K, while K has
no effect on e˜∗.
Proof.
de˜∗
dα
=
1
(1+α)3
> 0
de˜∗
dK
= 0
dP∗ante
dα
=
1
(1+α)3
+
2(1+α)K
α2 (2+α)2
> 0
dP∗ante
dK
=− (1+α)
2
α(2+α)
< 0
Lemma 2.5. The expected payoff of the buyer is increasing with K, while the expected payoff
of the seller is decreasing with K.
Proof.
dEUB
dK
=
(1+α)2
α(2+α)
> 0,
dEUS
dK
=− (1+α)
2
α(2+α)
< 0.
Lemma 2.6. The expected payoff of the buyer is increasing with α , if K ≤ α2(2+α)2
2(1+α)4
. While the
expected payoff of the seller is increasing with α , if K ≤ (α
2+2α−1)α2(2+α)2
2(1+α)6
.
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Proof.
dEUB
dα
=
1
(1+α)3
− 2(1+α)
α2 (2+α)2
K
dEUB
dα
≥ 0 ⇐⇒ α
2 (2+α)2
2(1+α)4
≥ K
dEUS
dα
=
1−2α−α2
(1+α)5
+
2(1+α)
α2 (2+α)2
K
dEUS
dα
≥ 0⇐⇒
(
α2+2α−1)α2 (2+α)2
2(1+α)6
≥ K
2.4.2 Case II (Participation constraint and incentive compatibility
constraint bind)
When K becomes larger, the condition in lemma 2.3 may not be satisfied, which ensures
both PC and LC to be satisfied. Under that situation, we will have solution at the kink point
which both PC and IC are binding:
Pante− e˜
2
2
=
Pante
(1+α)2
−K = 0.
Then we get,
P∗ante = K (1+α)
2 ,
e˜∗ =
√
2K (1+α) .
Under this contract, buyer will always sue seller if he shirks, since K (1+α)2 > K
(1+α
α
)2
. The
buyer will offer this contract if
EU∗B ≥ 0=⇒
2
(1+α)2
≥ K. (2.4.2)
Lemma 2.7. When K ≤ 2
(1+α)2
, the optimal pure ex-ante payment contract is:
e˜∗ =
√
2K (1+α) , P∗ante = K (1+α)
2 .
We can show that the case II contract is applicable whenever case I contract is applicable by
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K
α1
0
I (3.14)
II (3.21)
Figure 2.4.3: Legal environment for the two ex-ante payment contracts
The area below the red curve (2.4.1) are the legal environments (α,K) such that the case I ex-
ante payment contract is feasible. And the region which below the orange thick curve (2.4.2) is
where the case II ex-ante payment contract is feasible. Note that the two curves never intersect.
comparing the conditions.
Lemma 2.8. 2
(1+α)2
≥ α2(2+α)22(1+α)6 .
Proof. 2
(1+α)2
≥ α2(2+α)22(1+α)6 is equivalent to
4(1+α)4 ≥ α2(2+α)2,
which can be written as 4+16α+20α2+12α3+3α4 ≥ 0. Given α ≥ 1, the inequality holds.
To see it in diagram, see figure 2.4.3. The following lemma shows that the case I ex-ante
payment contract is superior.
Lemma 2.9. The case I ex-ante payment contract will be offered whenever it is applicable.
The intuition of this result is clear, as the kink-point solution is only taken when the tangency
is no longer applicable. Another way to see this, by Le Chatelier’s principle, case I solution
comes with only IC constraint, but case II comes with an extra constraint PC.
2.4.3 Case III (Participation constraint binds)
When K keep increasing, the solution will go back to the tangency, on the left of the inter-
section point of PC and IC, where only PC binds.
max
e˜,Pante
e˜−Pante s.t. Pante = e˜
2
2
,
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K
α1
0
B sues S (4.25)
IC (4.24)
B offers (4.20)
2
Figure 2.4.4: Legal environment for the second and third ex-ante payment contract
The two green curves (2.4.3) and (2.4.4) are the corresponding constrains for the case III con-
tract to be feasible. This diagram shows when α is low, the feasible region of the case III
contract is within the boundary of the case II contract, where under the orange thick curve
(2.4.2), but when α > 2, this is not true.
e˜∗ = 1, Pante =
1
2
, EUP =
1
2
.
There are two constraints need to be satisfied, firstly the IC that the seller exert the required
effort.
K ≥ 1
2(1+α)2
. (2.4.3)
The other one is that the buyer would sue the seller if the seller shirks,
K ≤ α
2
2(1+α)2
. (2.4.4)
Lemma 2.10. When the fixed cost of litigation is medium, 1
2(1+α)2
≤ K ≤ α2
2(1+α)2
, the optimal
pure ex-ante payment contract will be,
e˜∗ = 1, Pante =
1
2
.
2.4.4 Case IV (Participation constraint & legal constraint bind)
When K becomes really high such that LC lies on the price level associated with the efficient
effort level, i.e. when K = α
2
2(1+α)2
, LC will have effect on the solution. The solution will be at
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the intersection point of PC and LC.
Pante =
e˜2
2
= K
(
1+α
α
)2
e˜=
√
2K
(
1+α
α
)
To check that the IC is satisfied,
α(2+α)
(1+α)2
Pante+K ≥ e˜
2
2
=⇒ K ≥ Pante
(1+α)2
.
By substitute Pante =K
(1+α
α
)2
into the inequality, we have α2 ≥ 1. Since by assumption α > 1,
the inequality holds. But the buyer will only offer this contract if this gives him positive payoff.
EU∗B = e˜−Pante ≥ 0=⇒
√
2K
(
1+α
α
)
≥ K
(
1+α
α
)2
,
which can be simplified as
K ≤ 2α
2
(1+α)2
. (2.4.5)
Lemma 2.11. The optimal pure ex-ante payment contract with binding PC and LC is, if α
2
2(1+α)2
≤
K ≤ 2α2
(1+α)2
,
e˜∗ =
√
2K
(
1+α
α
)
, P∗ante = K
(
1+α
α
)2
.
2.5 Ex-post Payment
Let us make clear the timing of ex-post payment. After receiving the contract from the buyer,
the seller chooses to shirk or not. If yes, the game ends, otherwise the buyer chooses to pay or
not. If yes, the game ends, otherwise the seller chooses to sue or not. If the seller is not suing
buyer, the buyer will not pay for sure. So let us consider the contract that the seller will sue the
buyer if he is not paying:
Ppost ≥ K
p∗2
=
(
1+α
α
)2
K. (2.5.1)
Equation (2.5.1) is the legal constraint in the ex-post payment case, which defines the minimum
feasible payment.
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For the buyer,
EUB =
⎧⎨⎩e˜−Ppost, if pay,e˜−Ppost(α(2+α)
(1+α)2
)
−K, otherwise.
So the buyer will pay if Ppost ≤ (1+α)2K, which is the condition for the buyer to pay.
The whole problem can be formulated as follows,
max
e˜,Ppost
e˜−Ppost
s.t. Ppost− e˜
2
2
≥ 0, (PC)
Ppost ≤ (1+α)2K (ICB)
Ppost ≥ K
(
1+α
α
)2
(LCS)
where equation (PC) is the participation constraint of the seller , equation (ICB) is the incentive
constraint of the buyer, and equation (LCS) is the legal constraint for the seller to sue the buyer,
if the buyer do not pay.
When K = 0, both ICB and LCS lies on the vertical axis, see figure (2.5.1). When K increases,
both ICB and LCB shifts to the right and there is a gap between them. The higher the K, the
larger is the gap. The indifference curves of the buyer are any 45 degree lines. The optimal
solution depends on the intersection point of the three curves, PC, ICB, LCS. When K is low,
the solution is at the intersection point of PC and ICB, where both PC and ICB are binding, then
that is the case I in the following analysis. When we have medium K, tangent point happens on
the PC which lies in the gap between between the ICB and LC, that is case II in the following
subsection. If the solution is at the intersection point of the PC and LCS, where both PC and
LCS are binding, and that is case III in the following subsection, which happens when K is high.
Before we dive into the analysis of the different cases in details, the result is provided first.
The optimal ex-post payment contracts is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2. Optimal ex-post payment contract depends on specific legal environment,
(α,K), which is summarized in the following table.
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e
P
PC
ICBLCB
breakeven
Figure 2.5.1: Constraints for ex-post payment contract
For the region below the red curve, PC satisfies. For the region to the left of the blue curve, ICB
satisfies. For the region to the right of the teal curve, LCS satisfies. All the region above the
black line give the buyer positive payoff, and hence itself is the breakeven line.
Case (α,K) e∗ P∗ante
I K ≤− α
2
(
2
√
2(1+α)−α−3
)
2(α−1)(α4+4α3+3α2−4α−4)
√
2K (1+α) (1+α)2K
II Kˆ α2+α
(1+α)2
2(2+α)2
+
(1+α
α
)2
K
III 1
2(1+α)2
≤ K ≤ α2
2(1+α)2
1 1/2
IV α
2
2(1+α)2
≤ K ≤ 2α2
(1+α)2
√
2K
(1+α
α
)
K
(1+α
α
)2
where Kˆ stands for K ≥− α
2
(
2
√
2(1+α)−α−3
)
2(α−1)(α4+4α3+3α2−4α−4) ,
K ≤ α2
2(2+α)2(α2−1) and K ≤
α2
4(1+α)(2+α)
Proof. By lemma 2.12 - 2.16.
In what follows each of the four cases will be analyzed in detail, readers who have no interest
in the derivation can skip to the next section.
2.5.1 Case I (Participation constraint and buyer’s incentive
compatibility constraint bind)
When K is low, we will have solution where PC and IC
Ppost = (1+α)2K.
So seller will always sue buyer if he is not paying, as Ppost = (1+α)2K ≥
(1+α
α
)2
K.
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K
α1
0
S sues B (5.12)
B pays (5.13)
breakeven
NotPay
Figure 2.5.2: Optimal ex-post payment contract
For the region below the red curve (2.5.4), excluding the area bounded by the dashed curves,
the case I ex-post payment contract will be offered. For the region between blue (2.5.3) and red
curve (2.5.4), the case II ex-post payment contract will be offered. For the region bounded by
the dashed curves, the buyer-default ex-post payment contract will be offered. For the region
between the teal curve (2.5.6) and the blue curve (2.5.3), the case III ex-post payment contract
will be offered.
With the binding participation constraint, Ppost− e˜22 = 0, we have
e˜=
√
2K (1+α) .
Which is the same as case II of ex-ante payment. Buyer will offer this contract if,
EU∗B ≥ 0=⇒ e˜∗ −P∗post ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to
K ≤ 2
(1+α)2
. (2.5.2)
Lemma 2.12. When K ≤ 2
(1+α)2
, the optimal ex-post payment contract is,
e˜∗ =
√
2K (1+α) , P∗post = (1+α)
2K.
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2.5.2 Case II (Participation constraint binds)
Consider first the optimal contract that buyer will pay,
max e˜−Ppost s.t. Ppost− e˜
2
2
≥ 0,
e˜∗ = 1, P∗post =
1
2
, EU∗B =
1
2
.
So seller would sue buyer if,
K ≤ α
2
2(1+α)2
. (2.5.3)
Buyer would pay if,
K ≥ 1
2(1+α)2
. (2.5.4)
Notice that, this is exactly the same as the type III contract in the ex-ante payment.
Lemma 2.13. For medium range of fixed cost, 1
2(1+α)2
≤ K ≤ α2
2(1+α)2
, the optimal ex-post
payment contract is efficient, where
e˜∗ = 1, P∗post =
1
2
.
2.5.2.1 Comparison: Case II Vs Case I
To compare this contract with the previous one,
EUIB ≤ EUIIB =⇒ (1+α)
(√
2K−K (1+α)
)
≤ 1
2
,
which is equivalent as
K ≥ 1
2(1+α)2
. (2.5.5)
But this is exactly the lower bound for the second ex-post payment contract to implement, for
any other K, EUIB ≤ EUIIB . So we have the following result.
Lemma 2.14. The case II ex-post payment contract dominates the case I contract.
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2.5.3 Case III (Participation constraint & seller’s legal constraint
bind)
When K becomes higher, LCS will be binding, and the solution is determined by the intersection
point of PC and LCS.
ppost =
e˜2
2
= K
(
1+α
α
)2
,
e˜=
√
2K
(
1+α
α
)
.
ICB must be satisfied as LCS is binding, the only condition need to be checked is that the buyer
is willing to offer this contract,
EUB =
√
2K
(
1+α
α
)
−K
(
1+α
α
)2
≥ 0,
which is equivalent to
K ≤ 2α
2
(1+α)2
. (2.5.6)
Lemma 2.15. The optimal contract when PC and LC are binding, if K ≤ 2α2
(1+α)2
, is
e˜∗ =
√
2K
(
1+α
α
)
, p∗post = K
(
1+α
α
)2
.
2.5.3.1 Comparison: Case III Vs Case I
The comparison depends on
√
2K
(
1+α
α
)
−K
(
1+α
α
)2
EUIIIB ≥ EUIB =⇒≥
√
2K (1+α)−K (1+α)2 ,
which is equivalent to
K ≥ 2α
2
(1+α)4
.
Thus we have a lower bound for which Case III ex-post contract is preferred to the Case I
contract. A question follows naturally is whether this lower bound goes below the lower bound
for the the Case II ex-post payment contract. The following shows that the answer is no.
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K
α1
0
LCS
ICB
breakeven
Figure 2.5.3: Legal environment for ex-post payment contract
For the region below the red curve 2.5.4, the case I ex-post payment contract is optimal. For
the region between the blue (2.5.3) and red curve (2.5.4), the case II ex-post payment contract
is optimal. For the region between the blue (2.5.3) and teal curve 2.5.6, the case III ex-post
payment contract is optimal.
3α2−2α−1 2α
2
(1+α)4
≥ 1
2(1+α)2
=⇒≥ 0
The last inequality holds if α ≥ 1. So when K increases from zero, the type of ex-post contract
will be offered is changed from Case I to Case II and then to Case III. See figure 2.5.3.
By comparing what we have so far, we get an important result.
Proposition 2.3.
For every ex-post payment contract that buyer pays in equilibrium, there is an equivalent
ex-ante payment contract, which having the same price and required effort.
Proof.
By lemma 2.10 and 2.13, the case III ex-ante payment contract and the case II ex-post payment
contract are essentially the same, except the timing of payment. By lemma 2.7 and 2.12, the
case II ex-ante payment contract and the case I ex-post payment contract are essentially the
same, except the timing of payment. By lemma 2.11 and 2.15, the case IV ex-ante payment
contract and the case III ex-post payment contract are essentially the same, except the timing
of payment. So for every ex-post payment contract, there is a corresponding ex-ante payment
contract, the only difference is the timing of payment.
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2.5.4 Case IV (Buyer default)
Proposition 2.3 is true if we only consider the ex-post payment contract that buyer will
pay. Now let us consider the optimal ex-post payment contract that buyer will not pay, where
Ppost ≥ (1+α)2K. Under this case, the seller will sue the buyer for not paying, because Ppost ≥
K
(1+α
α
)2
. But still the seller will provide the required effort first. This may seems strange that
the seller will do so, if the seller anticipates that the buyer will not pay. Actually the incentive
constraint when the seller anticipates buyer default
(
ICDS
)
is more stringent than the one he
expects no default (ICS).
ICS ≥ ICDS =⇒ Ppost−
e˜2
2
≥
(
α
1+α
)2
Ppost− e˜
2
2
−K,
which is equivalent to
K ≥ − 1+2α
(1+α)2
Ppost.
The last inequality holds by assumption, as all variables are positive. Thus wrong expectation
creates no problem. No matter what expectation the seller has, the seller will provide the re-
quired effort. The buyer will default, and then the seller sue. So in the following, we are going
to maximizes the expected payoff when the buyer defaults, subject to ICDS :
max e˜−Ppost
(
α (2+α)
(1+α)2
)
−K s.t.
(
α
1+α
)2
Ppost− e˜
2
2
−K ≥ 0.
The solutions are
e˜∗ =
α
2+α
,
P∗post =
(1+α)2
2(2+α)2
+
(
1+α
α
)2
K.
The condition of buyer not paying is P∗post ≥ (1+α)2K, which is equivalent to
K ≤ α
2
2(2+α)2 (α2−1) .
The buyer will offer this contract if EU∗B =
α
2(2+α) −
2(1+α)
α K ≥ 0, which is equivalent to
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K
α1
0
B offers (5.24)
B not pay (5.23)NotPay
Figure 2.5.4: Legal environment for the buyer default ex-post payment contract
The brown curve is equation 2.5.7. For the region in between the three curves, the buyer default
ex-post payment contract is optimal.
K ≤ α
2
4(1+α)(2+α)
.
Lemma 2.16. For low enough litigation fixed cost, K ≤ α2
2(2+α)2(α2−1) and K ≤
α2
4(1+α)(2+α) ,
the optimal buyer default ex-post payment contract is
e˜∗ =
α
2+α
, P∗post =
(1+α)2
2(2+α)2
+
(
1+α
α
)2
K.
2.5.4.1 Comparison: Case IV Vs Case I
To compare the buyer default contract with the case I,
EUIVB ≥ EUIB =⇒
α
2(2+α)
− 2(1+α)
α
K ≥
√
2K (1+α)− (1+α)2K,
which is equivalent to
K ≥−
α2
(
2
√
2(1+α)−α−3
)
2(α−1)(α4+4α3+3α2−4α−4) . (2.5.7)
Note that, for α > 1, the numerator is negative while the denominator is positive, thus the
right hand side is positive. So the condition says that K cannot be extremely low for the buyer
default contract to be chosen.
2.6 Optimal Contract: Ex-ante Vs Ex-post
We have derived various ex-ante and ex-post payment contract in section 2.4 and 2.5, a final
step is to ask under a specific legal environment, which contract is going to be offered. The
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optimal payment scheme depends on the following comparison,
EUanteB (case I)−EUpostB (non pay)
=
α(2+α)
2(1+α)2
+K
(1+α)2
α(2+α)
− α
2(2+α)
+
2(1+α)
α
K
=
α
(
(2+α)2− (1+α)2)
2(2+α)(1+α)2
+K
(1+α)2+2(1+α)(2+α)
α(2+α)
>0
So the case IV buyer default ex-post payment contract is dominated by the case I ex-ante
payment contract. In total the optimal payment scheme will be as follows, where P without
subscript stands for either Pante or Ppost,
Proposition 2.4. Optimal pure payment contract depends on specific legal environment, (α,K),
which is summarized in the following table.
Case (α,K) e∗ P∗ante
I 0≤ K ≤ α2(2+α)2
2(1+α)6
α(2+α)
(1+α)2
α(2+α)
2(1+α)2 −K
(1+α)2
α(2+α)
II α
2(2+α)2
2(1+α)6
≤ K ≤ 1
2(1+α)2
√
2K (1+α) (1+α)2K
III 1
2(1+α)2
≤ K ≤ α2
2(1+α)2
1 1/2
IV α
2
2(1+α)2
≤ K ≤ 2α2
(1+α)2
√
2K
(1+α
α
)
K
(1+α
α
)2
In diagram, see figure 2.6.1.
Proposition 2.5. The choice of ex-ante or ex-post payment contract is irrelevant, only when the
fixed cost of litigation is relatively low, ex-ante payment contract is certainly chosen.
Proof. By lemma 2.4.
To see what level of the fixed cost is low enough to have ex-ante payment contract, consider
the legal environment where α = 1. Under this legal environment, the ratio K/e∗ = 3/32≈ 9%.
This suggests that if the fixed cost of the litigation is less than approximately 9% of the total
value of the transaction, ex-ante payment contract is better than ex-post payment contract. If
we use the efficient level of quality as a benchmark, the ratio K/e∗ ≈ 7%, which is not too far
from the previous one.
We can understand this result by looking the ex-post payment contract when K is sufficiently
low. Consider the extreme case, when K = 0. Under this case, no ex-post payment contract
can be offered, because ICB and LCS requires Ppost = 0. Thus when K is relatively low, the
possible range of Ppost is severely restricted. If Ppost goes too high, the buyer has no incentive
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to pay, but when Ppost goes too low, the seller will have no incentive to sue even if the buyer
defaults. Hence only highly inefficient ex-post payment contract can be offered, whereas ex-
ante payment contract do not have this problem. There are no restrictions on the possible range
of Pante when K = 0, apart from Pante ≥ 0. Note that there are still other inefficient contracts
offered, with e˜< 1. The following result points out the reason.
Proposition 2.6. Inefficient contracts are offered due to either too high or too low fixed cost of
litigation charged.
Proof. i) When α
2
2(1+α)2
≤ K ≤ 2α2
(1+α)2
, the contract with e˜∗ =
√
2K
(1+α
α
)
, P∗ = K
(1+α
α
)2
will be offered. If instead the efficient contract is offered, either ex-ante or ex-post payment
contract, one party will breach the contract, the other party will be better off not suing the
defaulting party, because K is too high. The breaching party will be the seller if the efficient
ex-ante payment contract is offered, see equation (2.4.4). While the breaching party will be the
buyer if the efficient ex-post payment contract is offered, see equation (2.5.3).
ii) When α
2(2+α)2
2(1+α)6
≤ K ≤ 1
2(1+α)2
, e˜∗ =
√
2K (1+α) , P∗ = (1+α)2K is offered. And when
K ≤ α2(2+α)2
2(1+α)6
, the case I ex-ante payment contract is offered. These two cases share the same
reasoning, the problem is not because K is too high, instead the opposite is true. If instead
an efficient contract is offered, either ex-ante or ex-post payment contract, one party will find
it better off not to follow the contract and seeking litigation to resolve the conflict, because K
is too low. The breaching party will be the seller if the efficient ex-ante payment contract is
offered, see equation (2.4.3). While the breaching party will be the buyer if the efficient ex-post
payment contract is offered, see equation (2.5.4).
We understand that, from the proposition above, the cause of inefficient contract is the wrong
level of fixed cost of litigation being charged. So naturally that points out a simple solution to
the problem.
Proposition 2.7. Inefficient contracts can be replaced by efficient one when the the fixed cost of
litigation is within the range of 1
2(1+α)2
≤ K ≤ α2
2(1+α)2
.
Proof. By lemma 2.4, for any given α , if the fixed cost of litigation is within the following
bounds, 1
2(1+α)2
≤ K ≤ α2
2(1+α)2
, efficient contract will be offered, either ex-ante, ex-post or
mixed payment.
This result sheds some lights on legal reforms. One particular question is whether should the
legal sector shares some part of the cost. In the model we presented, a legal reforms can be
represented by a higher α , where the funding burden can be represented by a higher K. If one
of the purpose of the legal reform is to enhance market efficiency, then there are two general
lessons to be taken from our model. If the status quo K is too high, as described in part i) of the
proof of proposition 2.6, the best thing to do is to seek external funding. Otherwise, by raising
K, it will just make it harder to move into the “efficient region” for a given α . On the other
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K
α1
0
Figure 2.6.1: Optimal contract: ex-ante Vs ex-post
For the region below the purple dashed curve, the case I ex-ante payment contract will be
offered. For the region between the purple dashed curve and the red curve (2.4.3) or (2.5.4),
the case II ex-ante or case I ex-post payment contract will be offered. For the region between
blue (2.4.4) or (2.5.3) and red curve (2.4.3) or (2.5.4), the case III ex-ante or case II ex-post
payment contract will be offered. For the region between the teal curve (2.4.5) or (2.5.6) and
the blue curve (2.4.4) or (2.5.3), the case IV ex-ante or case III ex-post payment contract will
be offered.
hand, when the status quo K is too low, as described in part ii) of the proof of proposition 2.6,
the legal reforms better be funded by legal sector itself. The only exception, is that if the status
quo is already close to the “efficient region”, then partial external funding should be considered.
A question follows naturally is that how to we know the status quo K is too high or too low,
given the efficiency of the litigation system α . One defining feature is to look at the output
level. There will be overproduction when K is too high, as shown in part iv) of lemma 2.4.
And underproduction when K is too low, as shown in part i) and ii) of lemma 2.4. Another way
to discern it to look at the price, price will be higher than efficient level when K is too high,
and price will be lower than the efficient level when K is too low. By looking at either price or
output, and compare to the efficient level, we can get an idea which direction should the legal
reform goes.
2.7 Mixed Payment
Up till now, we have only considered the pure form of payment, which is either ex-ante or
ex-post, but not both. There is still one type of payment we have not consider yet, which is the
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mixed payment. There are many possible way to mix the payment, and I will focus on those
contract which satisfies the following conditions:
Pante ≥
(
1+α
α
)2
K, (LCB)
Ppost ≥
(
1+α
α
)2
K, (LCS)
Ppost ≤ (1+α)2K, (ICB)
α (2+α)
(1+α)2
Pante+Ppost ≥ e˜
2
2
−K, (ICS)
Pante+Ppost ≥ e˜
2
2
. (PCS)
Equation (LCB) is the legal condition for the buyer will sue the seller if the seller shirks.
Equation (LCS) is the legal constraint for the seller to sue the buyer if the buyer defaults on the
ex-post price. Equation (ICB) is the incentive compatibility condition for the buyer to pay the
ex-post price. Equation (ICS) is the familiar incentive constraint to motivate the seller to pay
effort. Finally equation (PCS) is the participation constraint of the seller. Given the number
of the constraints we face and the possibility of corner solutions, we are not going to study
in details the optimal mixed payment contract, but instead we will show that, when the pure
payment contract is inefficient, there are efficient mixed payment contract can be offered and it
is in the interest of the buyer to offer that.
2.7.1 Case I
Firstly we consider the solution with binding LCB: Pante = K
(1+α
α
)2
. Then by the binding
PCS,
Ppost =
e˜2
2
−K
(
1+α
α
)2
.
Then we have EUS = 0, EUB = e˜− e˜22 . Thus e˜∗ = 1, and hence EU∗B = 1/2. Since IC will
always be satisfied, as long as α > 1, the remaining two constraints delineate the effective
legal environment for this contract. The first inequality is derived from LCS, while the second
inequality is derived from ICB.
K ≤ α
2
4(1+α)2
, (2.7.1)
K ≥ α
2
2(1+α)2 (1+α2)
. (2.7.2)
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Lemma 2.17. When the litigation fixed cost is within certain bound, where α
2
2(1+α)2(1+α2)
≤
K ≤ α2
4(1+α)2
, the following mixed payment contract is feasible,
Pante = K
(
1+α
α
)2
, Ppost =
1
2
−K
(
1+α
α
)2
.
In order to have non-negative ex-post price, we need
K ≤ α
2
2(1+α)2
,
where this is satisfied by the LCS.
An natural question follows is that will ICS be binding? The answer is if so, the PCS will not
satisfy. By binding ICS, substitute in Pante = K
(1+α
α
)2
and e= 1, we have
Ppost =
1
2
−2K
(
1+α
α
)
.
This is the Ppost that satisfies the ICS, and it can be shown that this Ppost cannot satisfy the PCS
as follows.
Pante+Ppost = K
(
1+α
α
)2
+
1
2
−2K
(
1+α
α
)
=
1
2
−K (1+α)(α−1)
α2
<
1
2
.
As a result, it is impossible for both ICS and PCS to be binding in this case.
2.7.2 Case II
Another possible mixed payment contract is to set Pante = K (1+α)2. By the binding PCS,
we have
Ppost =
e˜2
2
−K (1+α)2
Again we have EUS = 0, EUB = e˜− e˜22 . Thus e˜∗ = 1, and hence EU∗B = 1/2. Since ICS will
always be binding, the remaining two constraints delineate the effective legal environment for
this contract. The first inequality is derived from LCS, while the second inequality is derived
from ICB.
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K
α1
0
Figure 2.7.1: Feasible legal environment for the mixed payment contracts
The case I mixed payment contract is feasible in the region between the green (2.7.1) and blue
curves (2.7.2 or 2.7.3). The case II mixed payment contract is feasible in the region between the
red (2.7.4) and blue curves (2.7.2 or 2.7.3). The region between the dashed curve is the region
for the inefficient case II ex-ante payment contract or case I ex-post payment contract.
K ≤ (α e˜)
2
2(1+α)2 (1+α2)
, (2.7.3)
K ≥ e˜
2
4(1+α)2
. (2.7.4)
Lemma 2.18. When the litigation fixed cost is between, e˜
2
4(1+α)2
≤ K ≤ (α e˜)2
2(1+α)2(1+α2)
, the fol-
lowing mixed payment contract is feasible,
Pante = K (1+α)2 , Ppost =
e˜2
2
−K (1+α)2 .
It can be shown easily that the remaining constraint ICS is binding. To consider the possible
range of this two contracts, see figure 2.7.1.
From equation (2.4.3) and (2.5.5), because EU∗B = 1/2, we know that the mixed payment con-
tracts are preferred to the case II ex-ante payment contract or case I ex-post payment contract.
And hence we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2.8. Mixed payment contracts improve efficiency.
Proof. Consider the region where 1
4(1+α)2
≤ K ≤ α2
4(1+α)2
, which is within the feasible region
for the inefficient case II ex-ante payment contract and case I ex-post payment contract. Now
instead with the mixed payment contract, full efficiency can be attained. See Figure 2.7.1.
2.8 Who should offer the contract
Up till now, we assume the buyer offers the contract to the seller. In real life, there are a
lot of cases where the reverse is true, which sellers decides the price, payment timing and the
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product quality. Typically it is also a take it or leave it offer. So in the following, the role of
contracting party will swap. Similar to the previous analysis, all possible cases of ex-ante and
ex-post payment contract will be studied in details. The first result is that, if ex-ante payment
contract is used, it is more efficient for have the seller as the contract proposer. The second result
is that, when the seller proposes, ex-ante payment contract weakly dominates ex-post payment
contract. Finally, when the mixed payment contract is taken into account, in particular the two
specific mixed payment contracts we have analyzed previously, ex-ante payment contract still
weakly dominates.
2.8.1 Ex-ante Payment
Consider firstly with pure ex-ante payment contract. The problem now can be formulated as
follows,
max
e˜,Pante
Pante− e˜
2
2
s.t.
α(2+α)
(1+α)2
Pante+K ≥ e˜
2
2
, (ICS)
e˜−Pante ≥ 0, (PCB)
Pante ≥ K
(
1+α
α
)2
, (LCB)
Equation (ICS) is the incentive constraint for the the seller to discourage shirking, while equa-
tion (PCB) is the participation constraint for the buyer, lastly equation (LCB) is the legal con-
straint for the buyer such that buyer will sue the seller in the case of default. Similar to the pre-
vious analysis, to envisage the solutions, we can start from K = 0, when LCB becomes Pante ≥ 0.
In this case, the solution is the tangent point on the PCB, as the ICS intersects with the PCB
only at points where e˜ ≥ 1.12 When K increases up to some threshold, the LCB will becomes
binding, limiting the offer e˜≥ 1. Under this case, the solution is at the intersection point of LCB
and PCB. We are now going to analyze these two cases formally.
2.8.1.1 Case I (Buyer’s Participation Constraint binds)
When K is small, the only binding constraint is the PCB. The incentive constraint of the
seller must be slack, as shown in footnote 12. The seller’s problem is
maxPante− e˜
2
2
, s.t. e˜−Pante ≥ 0.
12When K = 0, the intersection point of PCB and LCB is Pante = e˜ =
2α(2+α)
(1+α)2
, it will be greater than 1 if
2α (2+α)≥ (1+α)2 =⇒ α2+2α−1≥ 0, which is satisfied by the assumption α ≥ 1.
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The solution to the problem is
e˜∗ = 1 P∗ante = 1.
There are two corresponding conditions for this contract to be effective. First, it is the ICS,
which requires
K ≥ 1−2α−α
2
2(1+α)2
.
Since α ≥ 1 and K ≥ 0, this condition must be satisfied. In other words, we only need to
consider LCB, which requires
K ≤
(
α
1+α
)2
. (2.8.1)
Lemma 2.19. When the fixed cost of litigation is low enough, K ≤ ( α1+α )2, the optimal seller-
proposed ex-ante payment contract is e˜∗ = P∗ante = 1.
2.8.1.2 Case II (Buyer’s legal constraint and participation constraint binds)
When K increases to certain threshold, the LCB will becomes binding. The solution will be at
the intersection point of the LCB and PCB, where
e˜= Pante = K
(
1+α
α
)2
To ensure the ICS is satisfied, we have condition:
K ≤ 4α
3
(1+α)3
.
Because case II is the a corner solution due to the binding LCB, the EUS must be lower than
case I. Hence we have the optimal ex-ante payment contract when seller is the proposer:
Lemma 2.20. When 0≤ K ≤ ( α1+α )2, the optimal seller-proposed ex-ante payment contract is
e˜∗ = 1, P∗ante = 1. When
( α
1+α
)2 ≤ K ≤ 4α3
(1+α)3
, the optimal seller-proposed ex-ante payment
contract is e˜= Pante = K
(1+α
α
)2
.
From figure 2.8.1, we could notice that the region of efficient contracting is much wider than
the previous case when buyer propose the contract. So we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2.9. For ex-ante payment contract, it is more efficient to have seller as the proposer.
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K
α1
0
LCB
LCB
ICS
Figure 2.8.1: Legal environment for ex-ante payment contract
For the region below the red curve (2.8.1), the seller-proposed ex-ante payment contract is
feasible. For the region between the two green curves (2.4.3 and 2.4.4), the case III buyer-
proposed ex-ante payment contract is feasible.
The main intuition lies in that Pante is higher in this case, which can be view as a larger pie to
be competed in the litigation, thus allows a wider range of K.
2.8.2 Ex-post Payment
When seller propose ex-post payment contract, the whole problem can be formulated as follows,
max
e˜,Ppost
Ppost− e˜
2
2
s.t. e˜−Ppost ≥ 0, (PCB)
Ppost ≤ K (1+α)2 (ICB)
Ppost ≥ K
(
1+α
α
)2
(LCS)
where equation (PCB) is the participation constraint of the buyer, equation (ICB) is the incentive
constraint of the buyer, and equation (LCS) is the legal constraint for the seller to sue the buyer,
if the buyer do not pay. Again we can envisage the solution by considering first an extreme
case. When K = 0, virtually no ex-post payment contract can be offered, except the one with
e˜= 0, Ppost = 0. When K goes positive, we expect the ICB will be binding, the solution will be
the intersection point of ICB and PCB. After K moves up to higher level, the ICB will no longer
be binding, and the solution is the tangency point on the PCB. If K is of a even higher level, the
LCS kicks in, the solution will now be the intersection point of the LCS and the PCB. We are
going to examine these three cases one by one in the following subsections.
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2.8.2.1 Case I (Buyer’s incentive compatibility constraint and participation
constraint binds)
When K is very low, we will have the following solution,
e˜= Ppost = (1+α)2K
The LCS is satisfied as K (1+α)2 ≥ K
(1+α
α
)2
. The only condition is that the intersection point
is lower than e˜≤ 1⇐⇒ K ≤ 1
(1+α)2
,
Lemma 2.21. When K ≤ 1
(1+α)2
, the optimal seller-proposed ex-post payment contract is e˜∗ =
P∗post = (1+α)
2K.
2.8.2.2 Case II (Buyer’s participation constraint binds)
When K is higher, the ICB will be slack, and hence the only binding constraint is the PCB,
and the solution is:
e˜∗ = 1, P∗post = 1.
The two corresponding conditions are, firstly from LCS:
K ≤
(
α
1+α
)2
; (2.8.2)
Secondly from ICB:
K ≥ 1
(1+α)2
. (2.8.3)
Lemma 2.22. When 1
(1+α)2
≤ K ≤ ( α1+α )2, the optimal seller-proposed ex-post payment con-
tract is e˜∗ = 1, P∗post = 1.
2.8.2.3 Case III (Buyer’s legal constraint and participation constraint binds)
When K is even higher, the LCS kicks in, the solution will be at the intersection of LCS and
PCB.
e˜= Ppost =
(
1+α
α
)2
K
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The only condition needs to be consider in this case is the PCS, which requires
K ≤ 2
(
α
1+α
)2
Lemma 2.23. When
( α
1+α
)2 ≤ K ≤ 2( α1+α )2, the optimal seller-proposed ex-post payment
contract is e˜∗ = P∗post =
(1+α
α
)2
K.
To combine all these three cases, we have the optimal seller-proposed ex-post payment con-
tract.
Lemma 2.24. The optimal seller-proposed ex-post payment contracts are as follows:
(α,K) e˜∗ & P∗post
0≤ K ≤ 1
(1+α)2
(1+α)2K
1
(1+α)2
≤ K ≤ ( α1+α )2 1( α
1+α
)2 ≤ K ≤ 2( α1+α )2 (1+αα )2K
From figure 2.8.2, again as we have seen, the range of efficient contracting is wider in ex-
post also, when seller proposes. But the result is not as clear cut as the ex-ante case, since some
region is not covered. Notice that the the upper constraint (2.8.2) is the same as the one for ex-
ante payment (2.8.1), that means, when seller propose, the efficient ex-ante payment contract
covers all the efficient ex-post payment contract feasible legal environment, and there is more
than that. So we have the following result,
Proposition 2.10. When the seller offers contract, ex-ante payment contract weakly dominates
ex-post payment contract.
Proof. When K ≥ ( α1+α )2, the case II ex-ante payment contract and case III ex-post payment
contract is feasible, and having the same EUS = K
(1+α
α
)2(
1− K2
(1+α
α
)2)
. However, the
coverage of the ex-ante payment contract is wider than the ex-post contract, as 2
( α
1+α
)2 ≤
4α3
(1+α)3
. The inequality holds as α ≥ 1.
From this we know that, when seller proposes, the optimal pure payment contracts is the
ex-ante payment contracts shown in lemma 2.20.
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K
α1
0
LCS
ICB
LCS
ICB
Figure 2.8.2: Legal environment for the ex-post payment contract
For the region between the red (2.8.2) and blue curves (2.8.3), the seller-proposed ex-post pay-
ment contract will be offered. For the region between the light red (4.5) and light blue curves
(4.6), the case I buyer-proposed ex-post payment contract will be offered.
2.8.3 Mixed Payment
Similar to the buyer-propose mixed payment contract, we have place the same constraints on
the seller-propose mixed payment contract,
Pante ≥
(
1+α
α
)2
K, (LCB)
Ppost ≥
(
1+α
α
)2
K, (LCS)
Ppost ≤ (1+α)2K, (ICB)
α (2+α)
(1+α)2
Pante+Ppost ≥ e˜
2
2
−K, (ICS)
Pante+Ppost ≤ e˜. (PCB)
Again given the number of the constraints we face and the possibility of corner solutions, we
are not going to study in details the optimal mixed payment contract, but instead we will shows
that, when the pure payment contract is inefficient, there are efficient mixed payment contract
can be offered.
2.8.3.1 Case I
Set Pante =
(1+α
α
)2
K, then by binding PCB,
Ppost = e˜−
(
1+α
α
)2
K.
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K
α1
0
(LCS, e=2) or (LCB)
(LCS, e=1)
(ICB, e=2)
(ICB, e=1)
Figure 2.8.3: Legal environment for the case I mixed payment contract
When e˜= 1, for the region between the two thick blue curves (8.15 and 8.16), the case I seller-
proposed mixed payment contract is feasible.
Seller will always choose to pay effort if e˜ ≤ 2, which in order to maximize expected utility,
EUS = e˜− e˜2 , seller will choose e˜ = 1 if feasible. The feasibility depends on the K which is
limited by the following two constraints. The first inequality is derived from LCS while the
second inequality is derived from ICB.
K ≤ α
2e˜
2(1+α)2
, (2.8.4)
K ≥ α
2e˜
(1+α)2 (1+α2)
. (2.8.5)
Lemma 2.25. When the fixed cost of litigation is between α
2
(1+α)2(1+α2)
≤K ≤ α2
2(1+α)2
, the opti-
mal seller-proposed mixed payment contract is e˜= 1, Pante =
(1+α
α
)2
K, Ppost = 1−
(1+α
α
)2
K.
In figure 2.8.3, the thick blue curves are the two constraints respectively, assuming e˜= 1. And
if e˜= 2, the upper constraint will be the upper red curve (2.8.4, e=2), while the lower constraint
is the lower red one (2.8.5, e=2). Notice that the upper constraint (2.8.4) is, when e˜= 2, exactly
the same as the constraint for the seller-proposed ex-ante payment contract (2.8.1). So this
mixed payment contract can cover as much as the legal environment as the ex-ante one, but
there comes a cost. Which is the reduced returns from this mixed payment contract. Only
within the blue curves region will the seller earns 12 , moving either up or down the e˜ from 1 to
escape from the bounds, will reduce marginal returns by 1− e˜.
2.8.3.2 Case II
Just as above, we can set Pante = (1+α)2K, by binding PC,
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Ppost = e˜− (1+α)2K.
Seller would exert effort so long as e˜≤ 2 and the remaining two constraints are as follows. The
first inequality is derived from LCS while the second inequality is derived from ICB.
K ≤ α
2e˜
(1+α)2 (1+α2)
, (2.8.6)
K ≥ e˜
2(1+α)2
. (2.8.7)
Lemma 2.26. When the fixed cost of litigation is between, 1
2(1+α)2
≤K≤ α2
(1+α)2(1+α2)
, the opti-
mal seller-proposed mixed payment contract is e˜= 1, Pante =(1+α)2K, Ppost = 1−(1+α)2K.
In figure 2.8.4, the two constraints are the two thick blue curves respectively, assuming e˜= 1.
Which we can see again the feasible region is within the covered area of the ex-ante payment
contract. This again shows the inferiority of the mixed payment contract, and we have the
following result,
Proposition 2.11. When the seller proposes, (purely) ex-ante payment contract weakly domi-
nates mixed payment contract.
Proof. Given the condition which the ex-ante payment contract works is K ≤ ( α1+α )2. Both
conditions, (2.8.6) and (2.8.7), are less stringent than K ≤ ( α1+α )2, when e˜= 1.
The key intuition is that when the seller proposes, he will try to maximize the price, which
encourages suing in case of breaching contract, which provides enough incentive for fully effi-
cient contract to be implemented. However when the buyer proposes, he will try to minimize
the price, which makes it more restrictive for damaged party willing to sue, thus inefficient
contract are proposed, and that opens a room of improvement for mixed contracts, which is not
present in the case of seller as the proposer.
2.9 Literature Review
If we consider both trading parties are firms, then the timing of payment problem is studied
under the trade credit literature. The main focus of analysis is place on the optimal credit period
to be given. If prepayment is selected, the buyer assumes greater product quality risk since buyer
cannot inspect the product before payment. Conversely, if trade credit is extended, the seller
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K
α1
0
(LCB)
(LCS, e=1)
(ICB, e=1)
Figure 2.8.4: Legal environment for the case II mixed payment contract
For the region between the two thick blue curves (8.18 and 8.19), the seller-proposed mixed
payment contract is feasible.
assumes responsibility for assessing credit risk, financing, and collecting receivables. To put
this into a international trade context, recent cases of product adulteration by foreign suppliers
have compelled many manufacturers to rethink approaches to deterring suppliers from cutting
corners.13 Recognizing that product liability and product warranty with foreign suppliers are
rarely enforceable,14 some manufacturers turn payment into ex-post contingent on no defects
discovery. 15 Which is the case where the K is too high, and outside the bound of any contract
with legal protection, and hence the the buyer requests a ex-post payment in order to control the
quality of the goods supplied.
An example of ex-post payment in practice is a well-known and widely used financial con-
tract called trade credit.16 Trade credit is the largest source of external short-term financing
for firms both in the US (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) and internationally (Rajan and Zingales,
1995). Ex-post contingent payments (via trade credit) allow the buyers to learn about suppliers’
product quality and to withhold contingent payments in case the suppliers produced defective
products (Smith, 1987), (Long et al., 1993). Lee and Stowe (1993) argue that ex-post contin-
gent payments (via trade credit) can be thought of as a very strong form of implicit product
13Baxter recalled its Heparin in 2008 (Fairclough, 2008), Mattel toys of unapproved lead paint (Story and Barboza,
2007), Pet food due to harmful ingredients such as melamine (Newman, 2007).
14Foreign supplier’s product liability is rarely enforceable due to different legal systems and inconsistent law
enforcement practices in different countries. In some cases, the manufacturer may not even be able to trace
the true identity of the fraudulent supplier. And the legal process to claim supplier’s product liability can take
up to 10 years in foreign countries such as China, the processing cost of a legal case can be very high (Yang,
2007).
Similarly, warranties can be difficult to implement in practice. To get the supplier to pay, the buyer has to
prove that a warranty event occurred and that the fault for this event lies with the supplier. And the supplier
may be unable to pay, may refuse to pay, or may declare bankruptcy, and courts may need to get involved.
For example, as Sherefkin and Armstrong (2003) report, GM demanded $37.5 million warranty payment from
its supplier. But because Oxford Automotive was in bankruptcy, GM and the supplier eventually settled for a
smaller amount.
15A recent article in the Wall Street Journal (Vandenbosch and Sapp, 2010) supports ex-post payment as a way to
“keep the suppliers honest”.
16For example, trade credit contract “net 30” allows the buyer to delay the payment for 30 days, giving the buyer a
30-day interest-free loan. The trade credit period depends on the industry and on the countries associated with
the buyer and the supplier.
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warranty, because the buyer can return the product to the supplier and refuse to pay without
having to prove that the product is of low quality. More recently, Klapper et al. (2010) articu-
lated that the ex-post contingent payments (via trade credit) reduce the buyers’ risk because the
buyers have more time to investigate product quality before deciding whether or not to make
the contingent payments. For a general review of supply risk problems and solutions, see Tang
(2006). Theoretical models that explain trade credit’s popularity and the corresponding em-
pirical findings are reviewed in Petersen and Rajan (1997), Biais and Gollier (1997), Ng et al.
(1999), and Giannetti et al. (2011).
In the trade credit literature, Long et al. (1993) present an empirical model that builds on the
idea articulated by Smith (1987) that trade credit can provide product quality guarantees. By
analyzing a sample data that contains all industrial firms from 1984 to 1987, Long et al. (1993)
provide empirical evidence to show that the trade credit period increases when defects take more
time to discover. Emery and Nayar (1998) present a trade credit model in which the supplier
knows the exact time at which the buyer can verify the quality of the product and they show that
it is optimal for the supplier to demand payment at the instant before the buyer can verify the
product quality. Similarly, Lee and Stowe (1993) propose a signaling model where the quality
of the product is known to the supplier but not the buyer and find a separating equilibrium,
in which trade credit terms reflect product quality. My model differs from Smith (1987); Lee
and Stowe (1993); Emery and Nayar (1998). I do not assume that the quality of the product is
exogenous. Instead, I consider the case when the seller can optimally decide on whether or not
to shirk, so that the seller’s decision is endogenous. Thus I am solving a moral hazard problem
rather than a signaling problem.
Babich and Tang (2012) examined simple contingent payment mechanisms to deter suppliers
from product adulteration under which the contingent payments are fully controlled by the
manufacturer: deferred payment, inspection, and combined mechanisms. They established the
conditions under which one mechanism dominates the others. Their study primarily focused on
the moral hazard on the seller side, but the moral hazard on the buyer side is not discussed at
all. Different from their setup, inspection carries no uncertainty in my paper. Product quality is
known immediately once passed to the buyer, which I abstract away from the exact duration of
trade credit period.
Dnes, A. W. (1999) consider licensing or franchising agreement in a country with limited
rule of law where the franchiser may abscond. The contract needs to be self-supporting, which
may be achieved by the careful structuring of the timing of payments. The main idea can be
illustrated by the following inequality, P≤ kL+(1− k)(L−D), where P = franchiser’s profits
from completing contract, L = initial franchise fee, k = probability of franchiser successfully
absconding and D = penalty applied to absconding franchiser.17 So this is essentially an incen-
tive constraint. By singling out L, we have a upper limit of the initial fee (ex-ante payment),
L ≤ P+ (1− k)D. So the rest of the payment will pay ex-post to ensure franchiser at least
17This is a simplified version by assuming sunk cost to be zero.
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break-even. The probability of run-away, k, is exogenous, but in my paper, it is endogenous and
both parties have this chance. My paper explicitly model the litigation part which each party
decides his spending for the lawsuit.
Faith and Tollison (1980) is the most relevant paper which they directly deal with timing of
payment problem. Although there are several interesting claims, it contains no formal model.
They suggest timing of payment is an informal institutions that have evolved alongside formal
contracts to mitigate agency cost. Their basic claim is that ex-post payment is a rational in-
stitutional arrangement to control the significant transaction costs inherent in certain types of
exchanges characterized by interpersonal differences in information. There are two cases: Case
I - Both traders are equally imperfectly informed ex-ante and equally better informed ex-post.
Case II - The seller has an informational advantage ex-ante, but buyer and seller are equally
informed ex post. The main problem faced by the seller in the product market, when using ex-
post payment is that buyer refuse to pay. But since in general, sellers are competing for buyers,
while the reverse is not usually the case, so ex-post payment is a more rational arrangement.
Faith and Tollison (1980) paper is full of insight, the main drawback is that the lack of formal
modeling of their claims. My paper provides a simple formal model to analyze the timing of
payment, while there is no interpersonal differences in information.
Smith and Cox (1985) provides an empirical study of pricing routine legal services. Price
may be determined either ex ante or ex post supply. A large cross-sectional survey of law
firms does suggest significant variation in whether fixed fee pricing or hourly rate pricing is
adopted. Contractual provisions may be understood as a market response to differences in the
relative potential for opportunistic cheating by buyers (clients) and by sellers (law firms). But
there is a key difference between my paper and theirs. They assume that contracts are perfectly
enforceable, so the main focus is on the timing of price determination.
Lee and Png (1990) studies the role of installment payments in relationships characterized
by moral hazard and sunk costs. They rule out vertical integration and payments contingent on
the product of the contractor. Instead, each payment is negotiated as and when made. In such
circumstances, an initial payment serves to redress the weakness of the contractor in ex post
renegotiation. If higher effort by the contractor in the first stage increases the marginal product
of effort in the second stage, a second installment payment induces the contractor to invest
greater effort initially. The contract that they consider is renegotiation-proof, which means
there is no need for court to get involved at all, which is the key difference between their study
and my paper.
Chen (2004) shows the role of an up-front payment to a contract, with a two-state-two-period
model, under the reliance damage measure. He find that in most cases efficiency is not achiev-
able even when an up-front payment is employed. To achieve efficiency, we need three con-
ditions. First, a high enough total payment to make the seller unwilling to breach under the
efficient reliance level; second, a high enough up-front payment to make the seller unwilling to
sue under the efficient reliance level when the buyer breaches; third, a high enough trading price
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to make the buyer breach when the low state appears. Lacking any one of these conditions, effi-
ciency fails. The up-front payment therefore plays an indispensable role for efficiency. However
my findings suggest that efficiency can be attain even with pure ex-post payment, provided that
the legal environment is suitable.
2.10 Some alternative explanations of different payment
schemes
There are undoubtedly many other possible explanations for the various payment schemes
found in the market. It will be useful to examine some competing explanations. The following
discussion does not meant to be a complete list of alternative hypotheses, nor is it a denial of
the relevance of alternative explanations. The purpose here is simply to point out the existence
of some of the more prominent completing explanations.
One conceivable explanation of the timing of payment is that, depends on the good in ques-
tion, there is a payment scheme which minimizes the time costs incurred in making payment.
This explains multiple cash registers, express line, exact-change requirement. Generally speak-
ing, however, the time cost of paying are liking to be the same with respect to ex-ante or ex-post
payment.18 Ex-ante or ex-post payment would not seems to play a very significant role in
reducing the time costs of making payment.
The second potential explanation for the economic distinction between ex-ante and ex-post
payment system is that the latter involve an extension of short term credit to customers. But
according to this reasoning, there should not be any systematic difference among companies in
the timing of collecting revenue. If buyers prefer these short-term loans, competition among
sellers will drive all payment go ex-post. What can be said along this line of logic is that firms
which choose to extend short term credit by the means of ex-post payment, will try to reducing
relevant costs of default. For example, restaurants will have restricted and closely monitored
exits if payment is made ex-post.
A firm’s size affects its decision of payment scheme. As there is fixed cost associated with
managing outstanding credit, it spread over more customer as the firm’s customer base expands.
Furthermore, the larger the seller’s customer base, it is more likely to have more information
for some particular type of customers, specifically their credit quality. This led to the prediction
that bigger firms would more likely to charge ex-post. It is not very clear whether this holds in
general, as counter examples can be found easily.
Another reason why upfront payment will be preferred is because it increases turnover. Con-
sider any restaurant who have fixed number of table, limited operating hours per day, the longer
is a customer staying after finished his meal, the less money is making. But why the staying
18But not likely to be the same for mixed payment, which requires customer paying twice, in advance and after-
ward.
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time is related to the timing of payment? The argument is mainly about customer psychology,
customers who have not paid can justify their occupation of a table, by the mere possibility of
further ordering. On the other hand, those who have pay will have no moral justification for
staying after their meals are finished. Although this sounds convincing, a higher table turnover
does not necessarily associated with higher profit. A related side issue is that, tips must be pay
afterward in order to grade the service, which is one of the key reason why there are ex-post
payment in restaurant who concerns for their service quality.
The last alternative explanation is that, from an anthropologist or marketing specialist view,
timing of payment may be due to certain social customs. Although there is doubtlessly an ele-
ment of truth in it, all normal social behavior is to some extent customary. A positive economist
cannot rest easy with such irrefutable argument. Custom itself is often an implicit compromise
of fundamental economic conflict, it deserves an economic explanation.
2.11 Conclusion
This paper provides a simple model to analyze the timing of payment problem. In case of
dispute, either the seller fails to perform or the buyer defaults, the court will get involved to re-
solve the conflict. The efficiency of the legal system and the fixed cost of litigation are the keys
for the choice of payment timing. My model predicts, generally speaking, ex-ante payment con-
tract is more prevalent in region with low fixed cost of using the legal system. But since under
this situation, ex-ante payment contract is inefficient, by using certain mixed payment contract,
full efficiency can be attained. The choice of payment timing becomes unimportant, as the fixed
cost goes up to certain range, with respect to the efficiency level of the legal system, both ex-
ante and ex-post payment contract are the same and perfectly efficient. Apart from the timing
of the payment, the model also have some implications for the proposer of the contract. For
ex-ante payment contract, it is more efficient to have the seller as the proposer of the contract,
in the sense that it is enforceable in a much wider legal environment. An interesting finding
is that, when seller proposes, a simple ex-ante payment contract dominates ex-post payment,
which may explain why most of the offers in everyday life are made by the sellers in a simple
ex-ante payment form. This suggests that primarily mixed payment is a contractual device used
by the buyer to mitigate the two sided moral hazard problem. Besides, this paper also sheds
light on the self-funding issue of legal reform.
2.12 Appendix
2.12.1 Perfect Tender Rule
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) stipulates in section 2-601 that “if the goods or the
tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may (a) reject the
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whole; or (b) accept the whole; or (c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.”
Bohlen (1900a; pp. 397f) states that in commercial contracts, courts cannot “force upon [the
contract parties] the duty to accept anything differing in the most minute detail from which
they have contracted for.” In a companion paper, Bohlen (1900b; p. 484) finds clear evidence
for the application of strict compliance in state and federal jurisdiction and summarizes that
“if either party be guilty of a breach either in delivery or payment, either as to the first or any
subsequent portion, then the other party at his option may terminate all of the contract which is
still executory.”19
In Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith,20 upon driving a new automobile home from the
dealer’s showroom, the buyer discovered that it was practically inoperable because of a trans-
mission so defective as to require replacement. The court refused to permit the dealer to sub-
stitute a new transmission, reasoning that the magnitude of this type of defect upset the peace
of mind of the buyer and indeed shattered the buyer’s faith in the vehicle. The court reasoned,
”Once their faith is shaken, the vehicle loses not only its real value in their eyes, but becomes
an instrument whose integrity is substantially impaired and whose operation is fraught with
apprehension.”
In Joc Oil USA, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York,21 the court agreed that per-
mitting a seller to cure if he had pre-delivery knowledge of the nonconformity but nevertheless
reasonably believed the tender would be accepted. “The innocent seller who ships his goods
in good faith, reasonably believing that they are conforming and acceptable would be given
no relief or redress, but all of the curative power of the statute would be made available to a
more culpable seller who delivers his non-conforming wares despite existing knowledge of its
[sic] defective, non-conforming qualities. It is difficult to believe that a construction rewarding
culpability and penalizing innocence is preferable, or consistent with the remedial intent of the
creators of this remedy”.22
19For instance, in a leading common law case, Norrington v. Wright (1885), the U.S. Supreme Court rules for
contracts governing the sale of goods to be delivered in separate installments and paid for on delivery that if the
seller makes a non-conforming, defective delivery with respect to one installment this gives rise to a buyer’s
right to treat the whole contract as breached and to terminate. In the later case of Fullam v. Wright (1907),
the court decided accordingly and stipulated that “[w]here there is a contract to sell goods to be delivered
in installments and the seller in violation of the contract tenders as a first installment goods inferior to the
requirements thereof, the buyer may not only refuse to accept the installment, but he may also rescind the
contract in toto.” Other cases include, Mitsubishi Goshi Kaisha v. J. Aron & Co., 16 F.2d 185, 186 (2d Cir.
1926); Buckeye Window Glass Co. v. Stewart-Corey Glass Co., 60 Ind. App. 302, 314, 110 N.E. 710, 713
(1915); Goldenberg v. Cutler, 189 A.D. 489, 491, 178 N.Y.S. 522, 523 (1919).
2099 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
21107 Misc.2d 376, 434 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
22For more recent cases, see Toshiba Mach. Co. v. SPM Flow Control, Inc., 180 S.W.3d 761, 776 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. granted); D.P. Tech. Corp. v. Sherwood Tool, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 1038, 1041-42
& n.6 (D. Conn. 1990); Marlowe v. Argentine Naval Comm’n, 808 F.2d 120, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Printing
Ctr., Inc. v. Supermind Pub. Co., Inc., 669 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ);
Tex. Imps. v. Allday, 649 S.W.2d 730, 737 (Tex. App.— Tyler 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
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2.12.2 UK system
Under the UK system, the losing party is responsible for paying all the litigation expenses.
In the litigation stage, if i is the innocent party and j is the faulty one, the expected value of
litigation will be:
Vi = p
(
xi,x j
)
C− (1− p(xi,x j))(xi+ x j+2K)
=
αxi
αxi+ x j
C− x j
αxi+ x j
(
xi+ x j+2K
)
(2.12.1)
Vj =−
(
C+ xi+ x j+2K
)
p
(
xi,x j
)
=−(C+ xi+ x j+2K) αxiαxi+ x j (2.12.2)
where C denotes the compensation paid by the losing party to the winning party, K is the fixed
cost of litigation. In the case of buyer default, the compensation would be Ppost.23 In the case of
seller default, the compensation would be Pante, which would leaves buyer not damaged.24
The respective first order conditions of the expected value maximization are:
dVi
dxi
=
αx j(
αxi+ x j
)2C+ αx j(αxi+ x j)2
(
xi+ x j+2K
)− x j
αxi+ x j
= 0
=
x j(
αxi+ x j
)2 (C+(α−1)x j+2αK)= 0
dVj
dx j
=− αxi(
αxi+ x j
)2 (C+ xi+ x j+2K)− αxiαxi+ x j = 0
=− αxi(
αxi+ x j
)2 (C+(1−α)xi+2K) = 0
Define x∗i ,x∗j as the respective litigation spending of party i and j in equilibrium. Thus we
have
x∗i = 0 or
C+2K
α−1 (2.12.3)
x∗j = 0 or
α (C+2K)
1−α (2.12.4)
23This compensation is according to the expectation damage principle. Under the expectation damage measure,
the defaulting party pays an amount that puts the other party in the position he would have been in had the
contract been performed. For details, see Shavell (1980).
24This compensation is according to the restitution damage principle. Under the restitution damage measure the
defaulting party returns only the payments made to him. See Shavell (1980).
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and the second order conditions are:
d2Vi
dx2i
=
−2αx j
(
αxi+ x j
)(
c+(α−1)x j+2αK
)(
αxi+ x j
)4
d2Vj
dx2j
=
−2αxi
(
αxi+ x j
)
(c+(1−α)xi+2K)(
αxi+ x j
)4
Since by assumption α > 1, the solution x j = α(C+2K)1−α < 0 is rejected. As a result, we have
only two Nash equilibria,
(
x∗i ,x∗j
)
=
{
(0,0) ,
(C+2K
α−1 ,0
)}
. I will take the second one as the
solution as the first one is associated with an undefined winning probability.
Lemma 2.27. Under the UK system, the optimal litigation spending is
x∗i =
C+2K
α−1
x∗j = 0
According to this solution, the equilibrium expected value from litigation is
V ∗i =
αxi
αxi+ x j
C− x j
αxi+ x j
(
xi+ x j+2K
)
=C (2.12.5)
V ∗j =−
(
C+ xi+ x j+2K
) αxi
αxi+ x j
=−
(
C+
C+2K
α−1 +2K
)
=− α
α−1 (C+2K) (2.12.6)
This means that, under the UK system, the court is a costless solution to the innocent party.
And the innocent party get compensated with certainty. This will completely deter cheating or
shirking behavior, and essentially we can obtain the simple first best solution.
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3.1 Introduction
In the standard theory of second price auctions, the highest valuation bidder wins the auc-
tion and pay the second highest bid, which is also the second highest realized value, due to
the truth telling strategy, see Vickrey (1961). This result is usually taken to be the outcome of
sequential English auctions. Bidders submit a bid just over the previous one, up to the level of
minimum bid increment, provided that is lower than his valuation. Otherwise he pass. The idea
behind this bidding strategy is that, there is nothing to lose, and by doing so, there are potential
gains.
This solution is called as ”ratchet solution,” ”straightforward bidding,” or as ”pedestrian bid-
ding”. There are two implications that are very often different from the actual bidding behavior.
First, bidding is expected to increase by the minimum amount, and bidders drop out after many
bids. In practice, bidding for corporate acquisitions typically involve large jumps, and ends in
a few rounds, see Ruback (1983). Cramton (1997) documented frequent large jump bidding for
personal communication spectrum rights in US. Borgers and Dustmann (2005), in analyzing the
UK sale of licenses for 3G mobile telephone services, found that, there were a significant num-
ber of jump bids. Haile and Tamer (2003) also documented jump bidding in a regular English
auction and reported that the gap between first-and second-highest bids is usually above the
minimum bid increment allowed. Cassady (1967) observes about private auctions that “...[the
potential buyer] may offer a high price at an early stage in the proceedings in the hope of scaring
off competitors.” The idea is that, in practice, if certain level of competition is anticipated, a
high “keep-out” is more likely to be a better strategy than a low initial bid, which hopes no one
or not too much competitive bids follows.
Second, the standard analysis does not examine the incentive of waiting to bid. It is very
common to see “silence” time in auctions, no matter it is online or holds in real place. Partic-
ularly if there is a fixed end, where bidder can adopt sniping strategy, see Roth and Ockenfels
(2002).1 In that case, almost all bidders want to bid at the last second and leaving no time for
others to react. Other than the strategic consideration, there is also a more general incentive to
wait, which is to learn others value by their action. And this would be one implication of my
model.
1Some auction website adopt free-end, unlike eBay which is fixed-end. For example, in amazon, if there is bid
submitted at the last 10 minutes, it will extend for 10 more minutes.
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One of the reason for these discrepancies between the theoretical predictions and empirical
observations is that, in some spontaneous auctions, submitting and revising a bid is costly.
Hirshleifer and Png (1989) suggest that “In reality, the cost of making and revising takeover bids
is far from trivial. It includes fees to counsel, investment bankers, and other outside advisors,
the opportunity cost of executive time, and the cost of obtaining financing for the bid.” Bidding
costs are also affected by federal and state laws governing takeovers. “For instance, federal
law specifies that shareholders who tender to one bidder must be allowed to withdraw their
shares as long as the offer remains open. This allows shareholders to tender to a competing
bidder. The shorter the time available for shareholders to withdraw shares tendered to an earlier
bidder, the higher the cost of making a counterbid.” And in Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998), “ in
the US some mandated S.E.C. information filings have to be repeated with each bid revision.”
Seyhun (2000) notes that unsuccessful takeover bidders experience stock returns of negative 0.7
percent, in contrast with positive 0.7 percent for the successful bidders, which is consistent with
the hypothesis here. This paper is interested in generalizing this idea and try to formalize it, and
hopefully to have some interesting and meaning results.
I consider a sequential auction model with private valuation and costly bidding process. I
show that bidders with low valuations will delay to bid in order to assess the strength of the
competition. In which we can consider as a learning process. The standard ”pedestrian bid-
ding” describes an outcome that minimizes the rate of learning. The equilibrium in this paper
is the one maximizes the rate of learning. Once the bidding process has revealed enough infor-
mation to persuade a bidder that he is going to lost, he should avoid the bidding cost by quitting
immediately. This allows the auction ends rapidly, which economizes the bidding cost — a
purely deadweight loss.
3.2 Literature Review
The auction literature is vast and huge. There are a lot of papers discussing jump bidding,
since this is not the focus of my paper, so I just list some relevant literature. For theoretical
model, see Rothkopf and Harstad (1994), Avery (1998), Isaac and Zillante (2007). For empirical
and experimental studies, see Plott and Salmon (2004), Isaac and Zillante (2005), Isaac and
Schnier (2005), and Raviv (2008). The most relevant paper found is a working paper by Daniel
and Hirshleifer (1998). In which they formalize a sequential auction model, where bidders take
turns to bid. And the winner pay what he bid. The key feature of the equilibrium is that bidders
would signal their value, not only from how much they bid, but also from the timing that they
submit their first bid. By their construction, the signal is perfect, and that economize on bidding
cost. The equilibrium they focus on maximizes the rate of learning, and thus the auction ends
rapidly. My model share all these features, but I consider a simultaneous setting.
Fishman (1989) examines a setting in which bidding is costless, but the second bidder must
pay an initial investigation cost to learn its valuation of the acquisition target. If the first bidder
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learns of a high valuation it makes a high preemptive bid which deters the second bidder from
investigating and entering the contest. Bhattacharyya (1990) provides models based on either an
initial investigation cost or a one-time uninformative entry fee. If the second bidder enters then,
he assumes that the target firm is sold according to the ratchet solution. He shows that the bid
level can be used as a signal of a bidder’s valuation. Both Fishman and Bhattacharyya papers
assume one-time bidding cost, they find a single jump occurs when the first bidder signals his
valuation. Their model exclude delay. But in my paper it is costly to bid at every round and
delay is allowed in equilibrium.
Easley and Tenorio (2004) argued that the cost associated with entering online bids and un-
certainty about future entry can explain jump bidding in an ascending-price Internet auction.
The model is similar to that of Daniel and Hirshleifer, with the difference that even if bidders
pass, they will suffer the cost. The motivation for the jumps is bidding costs and the use of the
jumps as signals. The model involves two identical risk-neutral bidders with private valuations
who will potentially compete over one unit. There is demand uncertainty, and with probability
q, the opponent will not find the auction. They find that when costs are zero, the ratchet solu-
tion is equilibrium. When costs are positive, the item can either be sold after one or two stages
or else remains unsold. They examined their model’s assumptions using Yankee-type Internet
auctions and found that jump bidding is more likely earlier in the auction and that the incentive
for jump bidding increases as competition becomes stronger. They also found that jump bidders
place fewer bids and that increased early jump bidding in auctions reduces the total bids placed.
The following section would be the basic setup of my model. Equilibrium is constructed in
section 3.4. Various analysis under different cases of bidding cost and reserve price is done at
section 3.5. And then efficiency is examined in section 3.6. I conclude in section 3.7.
3.3 Basic Setup
Consider an auction, consists of T periods, there are two bidders and one seller. Bidder i’s
utility function, i ∈ {1, ...,N}, is assumed to be:
Ui =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
θ i− price− cni if he wins
−cni if he bids and loses
0 if he does not bid
where θ i is bidder i’s private value, price is the amount he is going to pay to the seller if he
wins, c is the per period bidding cost and ni is number of times that bidder i bids.2 Bidder’s
2The quasi-linear functional form is the standard assumption adopt in the literature, and the only difference is
the cni being added at the end. And actually the bidding cost component can be reduced to c. Since in the
following proposed equilibrium, no bidder would bid more than one time, hence, ni = 1.
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value is continuously distributed within certain bound, θ ∼ [0,θ ]. Bidder’s value are identical
and independently distributed, θ ∼ F(·). All these are common knowledge.
Similarly, seller’s profit function take the form:
πS =
⎧⎨⎩price−θ s if someone wins0 otherwise
where θ s denotes the seller’s value of the auction item.
The auction run as follows, at each period, every bidder can bid. And they submit their bid
directly to auctioneer — no other people observe their bid. At the end of each period, the second
highest bid is announced. If there is only one bid, the announced value would be either zero or
the reserve price (r), depends on whether the bid submitted is higher than the reserve price (r)
or not. The auction ends after period T, and the bidder submitted the highest bid wins and pay
the second highest bid being announced at the last period.
So essentially, it is just a multiple period second price sealed bid auction. And by standard
argument, bidder’s strategy is to tell the truth, they bid θ i.
The timing of the model is as follows:
1. Auctioneer announces bidding cost (c)
2. Seller announces reserve price (r) and number of period (T)
3. Bidders know their own private value, then decide their bidding strategy
3.4 Equilibrium
We need to construct a sequence of critical values that determines the timing of bid-
ding, where bidders who have value θt ≤ θ ≤ θt−1 will bid in period t. Consider in period
t ∈ {1, ...,T − 1}, bidder with value θt , which is constructed as the marginal bidder who is in-
different between bidding in period t or t + 1, his expected utility would be, if bid in period
t:
EUt(θt) =
F(θt)
F(θt−1)
(θt − r)− c
Since he bid in period t, so he pay bidding cost c. But as he is the lowest possible type to
bid in period t, so he only win if the other bidder having value lower than θt , that is why we
multiply the gain, θt − r, with F(θt). And the condition where that bidder θt would bid, is that
no one bid in any preceding period. That implies the other bidder having value lower than θt−1
with probability F(θt−1).
And now consider what bidder θt will get if he bids in period t+1:
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EUt+1(θt) =
F(θt)
F(θt−1)
[
θt − c− F(θt+1)F(θt) r−
ˆ θt
θt+1
x
f (x)
F(θt)
dx
]
Bidder θt would bid in period t+1, only if no one bid in any preceding periods. And it
happens with probability F(θt)/F(θt−1), which conditional on all other bidders having values
lower than θt−1. The only extra term, compare with the previous equation, is the integral range
from θt to θt+1. It represents the expected price to be paid, in the case of the other bidder bids.
Which is the expected value of the other bidder, conditional on θt being the highest realized
value, according to the rules of the auction.
Since by construction bidder θt would be indifferent between bidding period t or t+1, so we
can equate the the equations above and get,
EUt(θt) = EUt+1(θt)
F(θt)
F(θt−1)
(θt − r)− c= F(θt)F(θt−1)
[
θt − c− F(θt+1)F(θt) r−
ˆ θt
θt+1
x
f (x)
F(θt)
dx
]
ˆ θt
θt+1
x
f (x)
F(θt−1)
dx= c
[
1− F(θt)
F(θt−1)
]
+ r
[
F(θt)
F(θt−1)
− F(θt+1)
F(θt−1)
]
ˆ θt
θt+1
x f (x)dx= c [F(θt−1)−F(θt)]+ r [F(θt)−F(θt+1)] (3.4.1)
Equation (3.4.1) generates a sequence of critical values, {θt}T−1t=1 , which guides bidders when
to bid in equilibrium. Since there is an end, the last period critical value would be derives as
follows:
F(θT )
F(θT−1)
(θT − r)− c= 0
θT = r+
F(θT−1)
F(θT )
c (3.4.2)
We set θ0 = θ¯ . Equations (3.4.1) and (3.4.2) generates a full sequence of critical values,
which guides bidders when to bid. To establish the equilibrium, I need to show that it is optimal
to bid as proposed, i.e. bidders having value θt ≤ θ ≤ θt−1 bid in period t.
Proposition 3.1. No bidders benefit from bidding earlier.
Proof. For a bidder who has value θ˜ , where θt ≤ θ˜ ≤ θt−1, his equilibrium expected utility is
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EU(θ˜) = F(θt)(θ˜ − r− c)+
ˆ θ˜
θt
(θ˜ − x− c) f (x)dx− (F(θt−1)−F(θ˜))c
= F(θt)(θ˜ − r)+
ˆ θ˜
θt
(θ˜ − x) f (x)dx−F(θt−1)c
= F(θt)(θ˜ − r)+
(
F(θ˜)−F(θt)
)
θ˜ −
ˆ θ˜
θt
x f (x)dx−F(θt−1)c
= F(θ˜)θ˜ −
ˆ θ˜
θt
x f (x)dx−F(θt)r−F(θt−1)c. (3.4.3)
Take the derivative, we have
dEU(θ˜)
dθ˜
= F(θ˜)+ f (θ˜)θ˜ − f (θ˜)θ˜ = F(θ˜). (3.4.4)
So EU(θ˜) is increasing in θ˜ at an increasing rate.
Consider the expected utility of a bidder who have value θˆ ≤ θa, deviating to bid earlier at
period a,
EUde(θˆ ,a) = F(θa)(θˆ − r− c)− (F(θa−1)−F(θa))c
= F(θa)(θˆ − r)−F(θa−1)c. (3.4.5)
Take the derivative, we have
dEUde(θˆ ,a)
dθˆ
= F(θa). (3.4.6)
Notice that the derivative is a constant. And it depends only on the choice of bidding deviation
— the bidding period a. Now we can rewrite EU(θ˜) and EUde(θ˜ ,a) as
EU(θ˜) = EU(θa)−
ˆ θa
θ˜
F(θ)dθ ,
EUde(θ˜ ,a) = EUde(θa,a)−
ˆ θa
θ˜
F(θa)dθ .
Since by construction EUde(θa,a) = EU(θa), we have
EU(θ˜)−EUde(θ˜ ,a) =
ˆ θa
θ˜
[F(θa)−F(θ)]dθ ≥ 0.
The inequality results from θa ≥ θ˜ .
92
3.4 Equilibrium
θ
EU
EUde
θ1
Figure 3.4.1: No benefit for bidding earlier
The same idea can be illustrated graphically. Consider bidder θ1, he is indifferent to bid
between period 1 and 2, so EU(θ1) = EUde(θ1,1). And from equation (3.4.4) and (3.4.6), we
have dEU(θ˜)
dθ˜ = F(θ˜) and
dEUde(θˆ)
dθˆ
= F(θ1), hence we have figure (3.4.1):
It clearly shows that bidders who have θ < θ1 will not benefit from deviating to bid at period
1. Similar argument can be made for period 2, 3, and the rest. So no bidder will benefit by
bidding earlier.
Proposition 3.2. No bidders benefit from bidding later.
Proof. Consider the expected utility of a bidder who have value θˆ ≥ θz−1, deviating to bid later
at period z,
EUdl(θˆ ,z) = F(θz)
(
θˆ − r− c)+ˆ θz−1
θz
(θˆ − x− c) f (x)dx
= F(θz−1)θˆ −F(θz)r−F(θz−1)c−
ˆ θz−1
θz
x f (x)dx. (3.4.7)
Take the derivative, we have
dEUdl(θˆ ,z)
dθˆ
= F(θz−1). (3.4.8)
Similarly, the derivative is a constant, and it only depends on the choice of bidding period. Now
we can rewrite EU(θ˜) and EUdl(θ˜ ,z) as:
EU(θ˜) = EU(θz−1)+
ˆ θ˜
θz−1
F(θ)dθ ,
EUdl(θ˜ ,z) = EUdl(θz−1,z)+
ˆ θ˜
θz−1
F(θz−1)dθ .
Since by construction EUdl(θz−1,z) = EU(θz−1), we have
EU(θ˜)−EUdl(θ˜ ,z) =
ˆ θ˜
θz−1
[F(θ)−F(θz−1)]dθ ≥ 0.
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θ
EU
EUdl
θT−1
Figure 3.4.2: No benefit for bidding later
The inequality results from θ˜ ≥ θz−1.
The same idea can be illustrated graphically. Consider bidder θT−1, he is indifferent to bid
between period T and T − 1, so EU(θT−1) = EUdl(θT−1,T ). And from equation (3.4.4) and
(3.4.8), we have dEU(θ˜)
dθ˜ = F(θ˜) and
dEUdl(θˆ ,z)
dθˆ
= F(θT−1). Hence we have figure (3.4.2).
It clearly shows that bidders who have θ > θT−1 will not benefit from deviating to bid at
period T . Similar argument can be made for period T −1, T −2, and the rest. So no bidder will
benefit by bidding later. And the equilibrium is established.
The proposed equilibrium has following features:
1. The order of bidding follows realized value descending, i.e. Higher value bidders would
bid (weakly) earlier, and lower value bidders would bid (weakly) later
2. Bidders bid truthfully.
3. No bidders would submit more than one bid, in equilibrium either bid once or not bidding
at all.
4. Whenever there is a bid in any period, no more bids in all subsequent periods.
Firstly, as the sequence of critical value suggests, in equilibrium, a group of highest value
bidders bid in the first period, i.e. θ > θ1, and then followed by second highest group, θ2 ≤ θ ≤
θ1, and it goes on similarly. The second point follows straightly from the rule of the auction. It
is a weakly dominant strategy to bid your value in a second price sealed bid auction. And this
is linked to point 3, bidders at most will bid once. Since they already tell the truth in the first
place, there is no room to bid higher. And since bids are truth-telling, once there is a bid in any
preceding period, subsequent bidders will not bid, which is point 4.
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3.5 Analysis
Now we turn our attention to the seller side, in general expected revenue is
ER=
ˆ θ¯
θ1
x ·2 [1−F (x)] f (x)dx+2F(θ1) [1−F (θ1)]r
+
ˆ θ1
θ2
x ·2 [F (θ1)−F (x)] f (x)dx+2F(θ2) [F (θ1)−F (θ2)]r
...
...
+
ˆ θT−1
θT
x ·2 [F (θT−1)−F (x)] f (x)dx+2F(θT ) [F (θT−1)−F (θT )]r
=
T−1
∑
t=0
ˆ θt
θT
x ·2 [F (θt)−F (x)] f (x)dx+
T
∑
t=1
2F(θt) [F (θt−1)−F (θt)]r.
Since seller value the auction item, expected cost is
EC =
T
∑
t=1
{(
[F(θt−1)−F(θt)]2+2F(θt) [F(θt−1)−F(θt)]
)
θs
}
=
T
∑
t=1
{(
F(θt−1)2−F(θt)2
)
θs
}
=
[
1−F(θT )2
]
θs.
Thus the expected profit is
Eπ = ER−EC
=
T−1
∑
t=0
ˆ θt
θT
x ·2 [F (θt)−F (x)] f (x)dx+
T
∑
t=1
2F(θt) [F (θt−1)−F (θt)]r−
[
1−F(θT )2
]
θs.
We will go through some cases below, firstly it will be c= r = 0.
3.5.1 Zero Bidding Cost and Zero Reserve Price
Let us first consider a very simple case, where c = r = 0. From equation (3.4.1), we have´ θt
θt+1 x f (x)dx= 0, that implies θt = θt+1 for all t. So we can apply equation (3.4.2) to get:
θt = 0 ∀t = 1, ...,T
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That means all bidders would bid, and they are indifferent to bid in any period. This is actually
the classic solution of the Second Price Sealed Bid Auction, where bidders just bid their true
value, no matter what others do.
Then expected revenue under this case will be:
ER=
ˆ θ¯
0
x ·2 [1−F (x)] f (x)dx
which is the standard result of expected revenue from a single period auction, with 2 indepen-
dent private value bidders.
3.5.2 Zero Bidding Cost
Now consider c= 0, r > 0. From equation (3.4.1) and (3.4.2), we get
ˆ θt
θt+1
x f (x)dx= r [F(θt)−F(θt+1)] and θT = r.
One obvious solution is θt = r, ∀t = 1, . . . ,T . It implies all bidders having value higher than r
would bid, and they are indifferent to bid in any period. This again conform the standard result.
Expected profit under this case will be
Eπ =
ˆ θ¯
r
x ·2 [1−F (x)] f (x)dx+2F(r) [1−F(r)]r− [1−F(r)2]θs.
To find the optimal reserve price, differentiate Eπ with respect to r,
∂Eπ
∂ r
= 2F(r) [(1−F(r))− r f (r)+θs f (r)] ,
r∗ =
1−F(r∗)
f (r∗)
+θs. (3.5.1)
Take for example, θ ∼U [0,1], then we have
r∗ =
(1+θs)
2
.
3.5.3 Zero Reserve Price
Now consider r = 0, c> 0. From equation (3.4.1) and (3.4.2), we get
ˆ θt
θt+1
x f (x)dx= c [F(θt−1)−F(θt)] , (3.5.2)
θT =
F(θT−1)
F(θT )
c.
96
3.5 Analysis
These two equations will generate a sequence of critical values. For illustration, consider
θ ∼U [0,1], then we have
θT
θ 2t −θ 2t+1
2
= c(θt−1−θt) and θT = θT−1θT c.
Assume c= 0.5, we have
Table 1
T=1 T=2 T=3 T=4 T=5
θ1 0.707 0.781 0.811 0.827 0.837
θ2 / 0.625 0.685 0.715 0.733
θ3 / / 0.585 0.632 0.658
θ4 / / / 0.562 0.599
θ5 / / / / 0.547
The values shown are corrected to the nearest 3 decimal place. For an example, in the column
T=3, bidder who have value higher than 0.811 would bid in the first period. Otherwise, provided
no one bid in first period, he would bid in second period if his value is between 0.811 and 0.685.
And if still there is no bid submitted, bidders with value between 0.685 and 0.585 will bid in
the last period . All bidders having value lower than 0.585 would not participate at all.
Several points worth to be highlighted:
• Critical values are monotonically decreasing from the first period to the last period
• θ1 is monotonically increasing in Total number of periods (T)
• Last period critical value is monotonically decreasing in Total number of periods (T)
• The difference between critical values, θt −θt+1, is monotonically decreasing in t
The first point illustrates one of the equilibrium feature, where higher value bidders would bid
in earlier period. The second point means bidders who bid in the first would be of higher value
if the auction is longer. The third point implies that the expected number of actual participation
- number of bidders who submit bid, would be higher in longer auction. The last point implies
that it is more likely to observe “late bidding” in a longer auction. As the the table above
suggests, a bidder with value 0.7 will bid at period 2 in a three period auction, while he bid at
period 3 in a four period auction. So when bidders realized values cluster at low level, a lot of
bidders will wait to bid at “later” period, or in the extreme case, at last period. This happens
when the number of period is too much — it categorize bidders into different group too finely,
in the way that no one is in the early period.
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3.5.4 Positive Bidding Cost and Reserve Price
Now we move on to the general case, with c > 0, r > 0. We can modify equation (3.4.1)
into,
´ θt
θt+1 x f (x)dx
F(θt)−F(θt+1) =
c [F(θt−1)−F(θt)]+ r [F(θt)−F(θt+1)]
F(θt)−F(θt+1)
E (x|x ∈ [θt+1,θt ]) = c QtQt+1 + r (3.5.3)
Since we know the conditional expected value is decreasing in t, QtQt+1 is decreasing in t. Then
we have,
Qt
Qt+1
>
Qt+1
Qt+2
QtQt+2 > Q2t+1 (3.5.4)
Proposition 3.3. Once Qt > Qt−1 in any period t, in all subsequent period j, we have Qt+ j >
Qt+ j−1.
Proof. Since we have QtQt+2 > Q2t+1, if Qt < Qt+1, then Qt+1 < Qt+2. By induction, all
subsequent Qt are higher than the previous one.
Corollary 3.1. If Q1 < Q2, then the last period is the one having the highest probability of
bidding.
Proof. Recall Qt = F(θt−1)−F(θt) is the probability of bidding in period t. By proposition
3.3, we know all Qt is increasing in t, started from period 1. So Max{Qt}Tt=1 = QT .
Corollary 3.2. The probability of bidding can never rise and then fall.
Proof. By proposition 3, we have this result directly. There are only 3 possible cases. From
QtQt+2 >Q2t+1, we haveQt+1 <Max{Qt ,Qt+2}. Consider fixingQt andQt+2 at some arbitrary
value.
1. Qt > Qt+2 =⇒ Qt+1 < Qt
2. Qt = Qt+2 =⇒ Qt+1 < Qt = Qt+2
3. Qt < Qt+2 =⇒ Qt+1 < Qt+2
So it is not possible to have Qt <Qt+1 and Qt+1 >Qt+2. In other words, if we represent it in
diagram, we will never have n-shaped curve for Qt .
Proposition 3.4. When Qt is increasing in t, Qt+ j+1−Qt+ j increases at increasing rate, and
vice versa.
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Proof. From QtQt+2 > Q2t+1, take the minimum bound to increase, consider period t is starting
point of increase
Qt+2 =
Q2t+1
Qt
Qt+3 =
Q2t+2
Qt+1
=
Q3t+1
Q2t
Qt+4 =
Q2t+3
Qt+2
=
Q4t+1
Q3t
...
Qt+i =
Qit+1
Qi−1t
Compute the difference of period j and j+1,
Qt+ j+1−Qt+ j =
Qj+1t+1
Qjt
− Q
j
t+1
Qj−1t
=
(
Qt+1
Qt
) j
(Qt+1−Qt)
Since we are considering increasing sequence, Qt+1 −Qt > 0, that implies the difference
is increasing in j. If we consider decreasing sequence, Qt+1 −Qt < 0, then it decreases at a
decreasing rate.
We may ask how is the optimal reserve price, with the presence of bidding cost, different
from the standard solution. To have a direct comparison, consider T = 1. Firstly we look at
how bidders behave in this case. From equation (3.4.2), we have
θ1 = r+
F(θ0)
F(θ1)
c,
F(θ1)(θ1− r) = c. (3.5.5)
This implies, if c> 0, then θ1 > r. Implicitly differentiate θ1 w.r.t. r,
∂θ1
∂ r
=
F(θ1)
F(θ1)+ f (θ1)(θ1− r) .
Since we know θ1 > r, and assume f (θ)> 0, ∀θ ∈ [0, θ¯ ], we have
0<
∂θ1
∂ r
< 1.
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Notice that θ1 is the lowest type that would participate. And in the standard analysis, the
lowest type to bid always equals r. However, with bidding cost the difference, (θ1− r), is
always positive. And it would at least be equal to c, when θ1 = θ¯ . If F(θ) is increasing, the
difference would be higher for lower θ1. And in general, it is
(θ1− r) = cF(θ1) .
Now we turn our attention to the seller, the expected profit is
π =
ˆ θ¯
θ1
x ·2 [1−F (x)] f (x)dx+2F(θ1) [1−F (θ1)]r−
[
1−F(θ1)2
]
θs.
To get the optimal reserve price, r, we can compute the FOC,
dπ
dr
=
∂π
∂θ1
∂θ1
∂ r
+
∂π
∂ r
where
∂π
∂θ1
=−2θ1 (1−F(θ1)) f (θ1)+2 f (θ1)(1−F(θ1))r−2F(θ1) f (θ1)r+2F(θ1) f (θ1)θs
= 2 f (θ1)(r−θ1)+2 f (θ1)F(θ1)(θ1−2r+θs) , (3.5.6)
∂θ1
∂ r
=
F(θ1)
F(θ1)+ f (θ1)(θ1− r) ,
∂π
∂ r
= 2F(θ1)(1−F(θ1)) .
Set the FOC equals to 0,
∂π
∂θ1
∂θ1
∂ r
=−∂π
∂ r
f (θ1)(r−θ1)+ f (θ1)F(θ1)(θ1−2r+θs)
F(θ1)+ f (θ1)(θ1− r) = F(θ1)−1
F(θ1)+ f (θ1)F(θ1)(θ1−2r+θs)
F(θ1)+ f (θ1)(θ1− r) = F(θ1)
1+ f (θ1)(θ1−2r+θs) = F(θ1)+ f (θ1)(θ1− r)
f (θ1)(θs− r) = F(θ1)−1
θs+
1−F(θ1)
f (θ1)
= r∗. (3.5.7)
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Recalling standard solution, labeled as rs, from equation (3.5.1),
rs = θs+
1−F(rs)
f (rs)
.
Obviously both r∗ and rs are greater than θs. However the comparison between r∗ and rs is not
that clear cut, and it depends on the inverse hazard rate.
Proposition 3.5. If 1−F(θ)f (θ) is decreasing in θ , then r
∗ < rs.
Proof. Consider rs− r∗,
rs− r∗ = 1−F(r
s)
f (rs)
− 1−F(θ1)
f (θ1)
Proceed by contra-positive, assume otherwise r∗ > rs, then we have
1−F(rs)
f (rs)
<
1−F(θ1)
f (θ1)
and since we know θ1 > r∗, so
1−F(θ)
f (θ) is increasing in θ .
The simplest example of distribution, exhibiting decreasing inverse hazard rate is the uniform
distribution. To illustrate, assume θ ∼U [0,1].
1−θ ′ > 1−θ ′′ ⇐⇒ θ ′′ > θ ′
rs =
1+θs
2
r∗ =
3(1+θs)−
√
(1+θs)2+8c
4
It is only when c= 0, r∗ = rs. For other values of c, r∗ < rs.
3.6 Efficiency
In the previous section, we mainly deal with the question of optimal auction. Now we
move on to efficiency. To ensure efficiency allocation, we want the object get sold to the bidder
i whenever θ i > θs, and bidder i would be the highest valued bidder, θ i > θ j. Since the auction
here we consider is just a multi-period second price auction, given the true-telling bidding
strategy, the winner is always the highest valued bidder. There are several possibilities that
efficiency is not attained, denote the highest realized value as θ (1):
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1. θs < θ (1) < θT , number of period set “too small” not allowing efficient trading occurs.
2. θT < θ (1) < θs, number of period set “too large” allowing inefficient trading occurs.
So the key point to ensure efficiency is to have an “optimal” number of period where θT = θs.
And actually this depends on two other factors. Look at equation (3.4.2),
θT = r+
F(θT−1)
F(θT )
c
If there is no bidding cost, c= 0, θT = r. Then the number of period does not matter any more.
And to ensure efficiency, we can simply set r = θs.
However, whenever c > 0, we want to have θT = θs + c, as any lower value of transaction
takes place would generate a net loss of value. At first sight, we may need to solve for an
infinite pair of (r,T ) that satisfy θT = θs+ c. But recall in the process of bidding, the bidding
cost incurred by the bidders is not going to the pocket of seller. It simply dissipates. To minimize
the dissipation, we do not want bidders bid in the same period. Thus we would like to have all
critical values as close to each other as possible. And to achieve this, we have T −→ ∞. In the
limit, we have
lim
T−→∞
θT = r+ c
This implies, to ensure efficiency, surprisingly we should set r = θs again. So we have the
following result:
Proposition 3.6. Efficient reserve price does not depend on bidding cost, it always equals
seller’s value.
One side issue may be how to compute the critical values when T −→ ∞. We can compute
the telescoping sum of the following equations:
ˆ θ1
θ2
x f (x)dx= c [F(θ0)−F(θ1)]+ r [F(θ1)−F(θ2)]
ˆ θ2
θ3
x f (x)dx= c [F(θ1)−F(θ2)]+ r [F(θ2)−F(θ3)]
...ˆ θT−1
θT
x f (x)dx= c [F(θT−2)−F(θT−1)]+ r [F(θT−1)−F(θT )]
which sums to
ˆ θ1
θT
x f (x)dx= c [F(θ0)−F(θT−1)]+ r [F(θ1)−F(θT )] .
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Take limit T −→ ∞, we have limT−→∞θT = r+ c, and in general,
ˆ θt
r+c
x f (x)dx= c [F(θt−1)−F(r+ c)]+ r [F(θt)−F(r+ c)]
So we can compute the whole chain of {θt} recursively, starting from θ0 = θ¯ . And it can be
shown that all propositions and corollaries in section 3.4 are still valid.
3.7 Conclusion
The traditional “pedestrian bidding” solution for sequential ascending auctions predicts
that bidding will always proceed by minimal increments. That behavior minimizes the learning
rate and maximizes the number of periods needed to find a winner. This paper consider the
effect of bidding cost which must be paid whenever a bid is submitted or revised. A bidder
makes a bid in early periods to signal a high valuation. Since that reveals bidder’s valuation, no
matter how small the bidding cost is, other bidders would be deterred to bid in the remaining
periods. This equilibrium maximizes the learning rate, so that each bidder needs to bid at most
once.
The rapid learning is at the opposite extreme of the traditional “pedestrian bidding” solution.
In reality, bidders often bid repeatedly. It could be explained if bidder does not know his valu-
ation for sure, and over the bidding process, he receives more precise signals of his valuation,
either exogenously or as a choice of further investigation. He will revise his bid upward if the
new information is favorable. This is one possible extension of my model.
When bidders delay before starting to bid, it reveals that a bidder believes he is unlikely
to win, and so find it not worthwhile to incur the bidding cost. A bidder who is initially too
pessimistic to bid, may gain confidence about his chance of winning, after seeing others pass.
The fact that an opponent waits unavoidably “signaled” that his valuation is low, which increases
the gains for other bidders to bid.
To sum up, I have provided a model in which, due to bidding cost, at each period a bidder
either passes or bid his valuation. This communicates bidders’ information rapidly. In equi-
librium under most cases, the auction effectively ends before the mandated one. The model
provides new results concerning profit maximizing reserve price and efficiency reserve price
in a costly sequential auction. Also a information based interpretation of delays in bidding is
provided.
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